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INTRODUCTION 
 
Does Europeanisation conduct member states to changes in governance and 
market regimes? Specifically, is the adoption of independent regulation and 
market liberalisation in public utilities a consequence of European Union? 
Although Europeanisation research has been thriving in the past ten years, only a 
narrow group of studies have made empirical attempts to untangle the EU’s 
specific impact from those of globalisation or neoliberalisation. Both terms are 
methodologically and theoretically loaded, and they have led to varying and wide 
policy implications. In essence, these terms have been used to explain policy 
outcomes in many studies across a wide range of disciplines, yet few have 
attempted to be terminologically conscious. It is important to untangle the 
impact of these two concepts from each other—whether they are complementary, 
contradictory, or disconnected—because academic works are never disconnected 
from politicisation. Without declaring finality on the conceptual debate between 
the two, my dissertation is an attempt to contribute to this issue. 
 
Notwithstanding, I explore the impact of globalisation and Europeanisation on 
Estonia and Poland. In particular, I situate my arguments in the debates on 
European Studies, International Political Economy [IPE], and Resource 
Geography. Some scholars are now speaking of the EU’s influence on the member 
states (Hölscher & Myant 2007; Bohle & Greskovit 2007), but the extent to which 
we can genuinely speak of a link depends ultimately on the extent to which EU 
policies were influential and embedded, in contrast to other possible 
explanations—and their evolving role in certain policy domains, specifically in 
public utilities. While Europeanisation literature has traced the EU’s influence 
during the accession period, the task for the second generation of researchers is 
to identify rigorously the impact of Europeanisation by untangling it from other 
possible processes, particularly globalisation. It is then crucial to test its impact 
systematically and empirically before the task to identify the continuation of 
Europeanisation after membership.  
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Furthermore, while previous studies compared the EU and globalisation’s role in 
policy transformation of public utilities in many of the older member states, there 
has been little effort to do the same in Central and Eastern Europe. The task for 
second generation of researchers is to expand this assessment on new member 
states. The focus on new member states could also illuminate the link of the EU’s 
influence (Bohle & Greskovit; Hölscher & Myant 2007), and unravel the 
mechanisms of policy transformation (Eikeland 2011). Therefore, following 
literature on stepwise comparative design (Coen & Thatcher 2011; 2008, Levi-
Faur; Bartle; Humphreys & Padgett; Lodge & Stirton 2006), my research delves 
into a similar comparison of telecommunications and energy in Estonia and 
Poland.  
 
I choose Estonia and Poland following the most different cases design, with the 
former associated with Baltic States and the latter with an institutionalised 
Visegrad group (Bohle & Greskovit; Hölscher & Myant 2007). Their findings 
suggest that despite their vastly different characteristics, policy transformations 
in both countries are embedded in broader patterns of political continuity and 
globalisation. Furthermore, these states have notable shale resources that 
continue to attract striking scrutiny from the EU and attention from foreign 
direct investors. As shale energy production is unique to these states at the 
moment, these resources, I believe, limit the EU’s influence on policy 
transformation. Therefore, these two-fold junctures are the departure points of 
the research. 
 
Why do I include the telecommunication sector? Why is it important to study 
these processes in the utility sectors? First, untangling the impact of Europe on 
network industries, or public utilities allows an assessment of Europeanisation 
and globalisation through the clash of policy priorities in extremely important 
state functions. Politics in public utilities represent negotiating, sometimes 
clashing and compromising principles of two highly regarded goals—public 
service obligations comprised of affordable prices in the short-term, maintenance 
of network infrastructure in the long term, and stability of utilities; and market 
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liberalisation, which consists of greater consumer choice, access of third party 
competitors to network infrastructure, and cheaper services. Public utilities or 
network industries present scholarly space to analyse the impact of globalisation 
and Europeanisation (Coen & Thatcher 2011; 2008,). Second, network industries 
are characterised by the reliance on transmission infrastructure for the 
administration of service. If the owner of the transmission infrastructure is the 
same producer and distributor, as was the case for most countries in the world 
after World War II, the owner might increase the cost for other competitors to 
use the same transmission infrastructure. Another variant of this comes in state 
ownership, which could bring problems to competition due to the privileged 
position of state companies. Hence, the EU’s regulatory regime focuses on the 
‘unbundling’ of production and transmission infrastructures, for the fair and 
non-discriminatory level of competition. Telecommunication and energy sectors 
are comparable since both rely on highly integrated and established 
infrastructures for the distribution of its services.  
 
Although my definition will be more specific later, in general, Europeanisation 
pertains to the construction of policies, norms, and initiatives from the EU level  
diffused or transposed onto the national level. From another perspective, some 
authors argue that Europeanisation is not an outcome, but it is rather a process. 
For the purpose of the research alone, I use Europeanisation as the 
‘institutionalisation of a shared political and economic order at the international 
level largely through membership in the EU, as well as in the creation of issue 
and sector-specific regimes at the EU level’ (Jordana, Levi-Faur, and Puig 2006: 
437-438). Similarly, globalisation is a largely methodologically and theoretically 
term for multiple processes. I focus on the consensus in IPE literature as a 
multiscalar process of increasing flows and interconnectedness associated with 
the broader economic restructuring of the global economy, imposing 
opportunities and limitations on state autonomy (Soederberg, Menz, Cerny 2005; 
Hay 2001). However, it is also widely recognised that globalisation is not an 
entirely external influence on domestic institutions, but it is also an interactive 
bottom-up and inside out phenomenon (Soederberg, Menz, Cerny 2005; Hay 
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2001).  While the term neoliberalism pertains to orienting risk and opportunities 
in the state economies toward the openness of the market (Harvey 2005), I use 
globalisation instead because of the focus on the broader economic restructuring 
of interconnectedness and the increasing pace of flows. 
 
Thus, I focus on two salient policy transformations from Europeanisation and 
globalisation (Thatcher 2011; Coen 2008). First is the transformation of markets 
or the liberalisation of the utility sectors, which is defined as the privatisation or 
non-state ownership of public utilities; this introduces competition to the sector 
(Coen & Thatcher 2011; 2008) by allowing fair access to transmission 
infrastructure. Although liberalisation could mean several different outcomes, I 
specify competition and privatisation to be the clear indicators. Competition 
pertains to minimising the barrier for fair competition to come in. Although ‘fair’ 
competition is subject to different meanings per context (Bartle 2006), I adhere 
to the EU’s definition. Privatisation pertains to the private ownership of public 
assets, whether these are foreign or national. Second, the transformation of 
governance comes in independent [re]regulation (Levi-Faur; Bartle 2006), which 
is defined as the creation of accompanying institutions—such as national 
regulatory agencies (NRA)—that are politically insulated from electoral volatility 
and politicisation. In the EU-level regime, the idea of regulation became 
prominent in the 1990s after the consensus on the European Single Market Act of 
1986. Following the logic that investors want predictability, adherence to the rule 
of law, and limited barriers to competition, the EU started to follow the idea of 
independent regulation, which mainly includes the delegation of powers to 
independent authorities. These people are presumed to be fair actors, governing 
on merit and competition, and not under the whims of politicians.  
 
How do we measure if Europeanisation matters or not? What should be the 
expected outcomes? Drawing mainly from David Levi-Faur, Jordana, and Puig, I 
nuance some of these answers in CEE context by specifying the expectation that 
pressure for policy transformation should be at its strongest during the pre-
accession process (Jordana, Levi-Faur, and Puig 2006: 440). First, there ‘should 
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be similar patterns and institutions of governance across’ (Jordana, Levi-Faur, 
and Puig 2006: 440); second, there should be varying degrees of market 
liberalisation ‘depending on the extent to which the specific European regime 
promotes it’ (Jordana, Levi-Faur, and Puig 2006: 440); third, a lesser degree of 
support for state companies, the most accepted model in CEE during the Cold 
War, via the advance of EU membership; and last, ‘new strategies of 
internationalisation by private firms, corresponding to the opportunities and 
obstacles accompanying the progress of EU membership’ (Jordana, Levi-Faur, 
and Puig 2006: 440).  
 
Specifically, the following questions comprise the main themes of the 
dissertation: 
 
● To what extent does Europeanisation impact public utilities of Estonia and 
Poland? How different is the impact before and after accession?  
● To what extent do resources matter in shaping policy transformation of 
energy? 
 
In sum, these questions constitute the nature of policy utility transformation in 
Estonia and Poland placed within the broader context of Europeanisation and 
globalisation. The first question unpacks Europeanisation from policy 
transformation in public utilities, especially its attempt to strike a balance 
between European and state goals and the influence of resources on policy 
transformation. The second question investigates the role of resources in shaping 
policy transformation of energy in Estonia and Poland. 
 
The arguments of the dissertation 
 
My research argues that the causal link between the EU’s influence, manifested 
through EU membership of Estonia and Poland, as well as EU regulatory regime 
of telecommunication and energy, and policy transformation, is weak. In 
explaining policy transformation, instead, I forward that Estonia and Poland are 
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able to internalise globalisation by managing and harnessing its economic and 
political opportunities. 
 
Specifically, this can be seen in two levels. First, for public utilities, the type of 
capitalism and state size are organising logics of policy transformation, which 
largely influence the extent and form of market and governance shifts. While 
some argue that globalisation leads to a process of economic and social 
institutionalisation, I argue that, alongside public policy literature, it is 
convergence towards regulatory capitalism. Although there are generated 
pressures from the EU to push for policy transformation before and after 
membership, the EU mainly facilitates the agenda of policy transformation, but 
the reasons for policy shifts in public utilities go back to the organising logics of 
state capitalism and state size. The EU’s effectiveness in pushing for policy 
transformation, hence, in public utilities, while aided by the acquis before 
accession, was hinged on its consistency and coherence with global, national and 
sectoral specific characteristics.  
 
Second, I argue that, specific to the energy sector, that unconventional energy 
influences the state’s expectations of globalisation by opening new political and 
economic spaces. In particular, it indirectly influences policy transformation in 
energy by giving opportunities to states and involving more actors. Resources are 
not just technical and natural objects to empower the state, but they parlay social 
relations. Shale energy in both countries modifies the social relations of the state 
and society within, between, and amongst the international community. The key 
point is that resources modifiy the state’s expectations of globalisation by 
opening new political and economic spaces 
 
Globalisation, in this sense, is not a wholly external force that influences 
domestic institutions, but conversely, it is a dialectic phenomenon that is also 
bottom-up and inside out (Soederberg, Menz, Cerny 2005). Although I find a 
general trend of transformative governance and market liberalisation in the 
public utilities of Estonia and Poland, their experiences of capitalism and state 
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size deviate significantly, especially the role of geography in limiting or enabling 
economic reforms signifying a divergence within a general trend of convergence 
toward regulatory capitalism. Notwithstanding historical specificity of the cases, 
my claim is that the type of capitalism, state size, and the type of resources are 
organising logics of the state’s management of globalisation in public utilities 
within the broader range of process accompanying globalisation and 
Europeanisation.  
 
Structure of the dissertation 
 
In chapter one, after reviewing the relevant theoretical and empirical literature, I 
develop a framework using varieties of capitalism [VOC], state size, and resource 
geography to examine the political transformation of public utilities in Estonia 
and Poland within the broader context of globalisation. As opposed to a strictly 
top-down view of Europeanisation, policy transformation decisions were 
constituted by complementing and sometimes competing articulations of state 
capitalism and state size, and resource types in utility governance.  
 
In chapter two, I present the research design and methods of data collection on 
how to examine the policy transformation of public utilities. The chapter 
develops a stepwise comparative design that synthesises two perspectives drawn 
from national policy analysis [NPA] and policy sector analysis [PSA]. I focus on 
telecommunications and energy to demonstrate the management of 
globalisation’s opportunities within broader patterns of regulatory capitalism 
using concepts like varieties of capitalism and state size. Furthermore, I draw 
upon resource geography as a way of understanding the possibility of using 
resources as comparators from the stepwise perspective.  
 
The final two chapters are the empirical components.  Chapter three focuses on 
utility governance in Estonia and Poland. I analyse these changes diachronically 
by starting from pre-accession to post-accession using a ‘stepwise’ comparison. 
While it is obvious that there is no single EU policy on telecommunications, much 
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more on energy, I engage in an iterative perspective of engaging the evolving 
nature of EU policies. However, even if EU policies in energy and 
telecommunications kept on evolving, there were common processes, or 
principles that were pushed forward such as liberalisation and independent 
regulation. In this sense, I compare the continuity of these principles and policy 
transformation.  
 
On the final chapter, the research looks at a different type of comparison, one 
that is based on resources, and assesses changes on Estonian and Polish ‘post-
accession capacities’ in shale energy. Although the chapters compare Estonia’s oil 
shale and Poland’s coal during the pre-accession phase in chapter three, I focus 
the fourth chapter on Poland’s shale gas after 2004 because resource 
comparisons could be done at that time and Polish energy mix started to change.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 13
CHAPTER 1 
LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
1. Introduction 
  
The literature review is divided as follows: (a) a broader review of 
Europeanisation; (b) a brief overview of globalisation; (c) the intersections of 
Europeanisation and globalisation; (d) a brief review of varieties of capitalism 
and state size literature; (e) literature on the Europeanisation of public utilities in 
Estonia and Poland; and (f) an elaboration of the potential theoretical and 
empirical contributions of my research.  
 
While I will discuss the general contributions thoroughly in the latter part of this 
chapter, the theoretical contribution of my research is that it expands the 
literature on Europeanisation in CEE by not supposing its effective relationship 
with policy transformations in general, specifically in public utilities, by 
accounting for the direction and form of these policy shifts, and by tracing the 
effectiveness of its impact after the accession period. By deploying the stepwise 
comparison, a relatively new comparative method that was developed mainly for 
the study of public utilities, I uncover the locus of policy transformations and 
forms of change in the hands of states during the pre- and post-accession process. 
Through the use of international political economy and resource geography 
literature, and theoretical traditions I draw from at the end of the chapter, I 
contribute to the timely debate in the EU’s role in public utilities, specifically in 
the energy sector and in unconventional energy.  
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1.1 Literature Review  
 
1.1.1 Europeanisation 
 
Traditional integration debates between neofunctionalism and 
intergovernmentalism ask the question Why do member states pool their 
sovereignty? This is the ‘ontological’ question in EU studies. Not discounting the 
first step but choosing to look further beyond the theorising, Europeanisation is a 
‘post-ontological’ inquiry, as the main point of departure is ‘after integration, 
what happens’ (Bulmer & Radaelli 2011, Exadaktylos & Radaelli 2009)? In 
response to the claims that only member states have influence in the EU, 
supranationalists and constructivist scholars have developed an approach called 
Europeanisation; that is, the impact of the EU on the politics, policies, and polity 
of member states (Knill & Lenschow 2005, 2002). Europeanisation is defined as 
the ‘construction, diffusion, and institutionalisation of rules, procedures, and 
policy paradigms, shared beliefs and norms’ (Radaelli & Pasquier 2009,Knill & 
Lenschow 2005, 2002), which are primarily formed, debated, and defined at the 
EU level and then transposed into the level of domestic discourse, public policies, 
institutional structures, and even group identities (Radaelli & Pasquier 
2009,Knill & Lenschow 2005, 2002). The process does not argue that Brussels is 
the only source of change, but EU institutions could also be sources as well, nor 
does it argue that the process always seeks domestic transformation, or a direct 
impact—as Europeanisation could also happen horizontally. Some questions 
hover at the widening scale of EU-induced transformation, while others even 
probe the normative questions of change.  
 
The application of Europeanisation is largely debated on two widely accepted 
approaches. The ‘top-down’ approach, also known as the ‘goodness of fit’, begins 
by comparing the ‘difference’ between EU Policy and the member state policy. 
There are two variants of the misfit perspective. The rationalist variant argues 
that the higher the difference, the higher the adaptation pressure; in other words, 
the bigger the difference, the more likely it is for an EU-induced change (Börzel & 
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Risse 2007). Conversely, a constructivist approach argues that adaptation 
pressure is greatest at the moderate level, since lower misfit does not entail 
change at all, and a high misfit produces extremely polarised policy positions 
(Börzel & Risse 2007). The second approach is the ‘bottom-up’ method, which 
departs not from the EU policy at the supranational level, but from the domestic 
level. As some scholars have argued, the bottom-up approach accounts for 
timing, tempo, and temporalities much better than its predecessor; instead of 
assuming that change happens primarily because and at the level of the EU, the 
bottom-up approach largely considers the impact of domestic coalitions and 
international pressures (Gerring 2010). At the risk of ‘pre-judging the EU level’, 
proponents of the bottom-up approach meticulously trace where does change 
come from and see what are the causes (Gerring 2010, Bulmer & Radaelli 2011, 
Exadaktylos & Radaelli 2009).  
 
There are three most common inquiries in Europeanisation research. First, 
Europeanisation as institutional change deals with whether and to what extent 
has Europeanisation affected the domestic system of interest formation, 
government interaction, administrative architecture, regulatory framework, 
executive and legislative bodies, and macro-economic institutions (Börzel & Risse 
2007). Second, the change of politics approach looks at how ‘domestic change 
actors seek to channel their interest into European policy-making process’ 
(Börzel & Risse 2007, Woll &Jacquot 2010). To put it simply, the EU offers 
incentives to some groups and not to others, thereby changing the domestic 
constellation of interest intermediations and political compromises made in the 
political process. Third, public discourse and identity change deals with the EU 
reconstruction of concurrent discourses, frames, and narratives of national 
identities, historical memories, and how it could legitimise and give credence to 
accompanying EU public policies (Woll &Jacquot 2010).  
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1.1.2 Globalisation 
 
Colin Hay’s works on globalisation cannot be ignored. Initially, he surveyed first-
generation globalists, who argued that global processes will envelope social 
practices across the globe, and second-generation statists, who believed the 
dominance of the state in pursuing policies globally and nationally (Hay 2001). 
He argues that careful empirical assessment reveal the regional characteristics of 
globalisation, the relative disparity of processes in various parts of the globe, 
which partially result in the unequal distribution of wealth between the North 
and South. As such, some strands of international relations theory—such as the 
English School or Liberal realism, which posits on-going processes of societal 
structuring amongst states in the international community—coheres with the 
premise that the impact of globalisation happens regionally. Justin Rosenberg’s 
works focused on the exaggeration that some scholars articulated in the 1990s. 
While there is no disagreement among scholars that something is changing 
across the globe, he argues that there is a lack of consensus on the degree and 
direction of change (Rosenberg 2005, 2002). More specifically, the failure of 
globalisation theory is its flexibility in being a cause and outcome at the same 
time, as well as its inadequacy to display its indispensability vis-à-vis other 
conceptual terms. In doing so, globalisation theory parlays a spatio-temporal 
reformulation of social theory or social relations.  
 
While neoliberalism and globalisation are sometimes used interchangeably, the 
former is often defined as a ‘series of economic and political reforms designed to 
structure risk and opportunities in the economy towards the openness of the 
market’ (Harvey 2005: 3). Neoliberalism is ‘embedded’ in the context, whereby 
the ideology is reproduced in the regulatory, historical, policy, and economic 
structures of the inherited institutional frameworks. Therefore, the extent of a 
country’s neoliberalism is contested and can be arbitrary at some point. However, 
perhaps the most useful idea or conceptualisation comes from the idea of 
regulatory capitalism. In contrast to neoliberalism which argues the broad 
restructuring of states toward market [in]cohesiveness, regulatory capitalism 
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argues that, regionally, state power transforms to effectively attract and manage 
capital for economic development. This definition, found in public policy 
literature, is perhaps the most consistent in the dissertation (Humphreys & 
Padgett; Lodge & Stirton 2006). 
 
1.1.3 Europeanisation and Globalisation 
 
The interaction of the Europeanisation and Globalisation has been widely 
debated in EU studies. The causes and effects of globalisation are extremely 
difficult to separate from the effects of deeper ‘regional integration,’ often 
referred to as Europeanisation (Jacoby & Meunier 2011; Radaelli & Exadaktylos 
2007). Since the two concepts are often intertwined in temporal and regional 
processes, there are several inquiries specific in the European case. The debate 
has been muddled because the interaction of Europeanisation and globalisation 
depends on the definition of both terms. Defining globalisation in most of its 
possible forms is beyond the scope of this dissertation; however, the dissertation, 
in direct relation to the theoretical contribution, looks at five most important 
aspects. First is the debate on whether Europe is affected by its own regional 
processes or by transactions with broader actors (Radaelli & Exadaktylos 2011; 
2007). Second is that globalisation defined as liberalisation is focused on debates 
whether the EU Institutions are enablers or insulators against liberalisation. The 
third facet deals with the role of the EU to externalise its own rules beyond its 
borders, specifically in an effort to ‘Europeanise’ globalisation (Jacoby & Meunier 
2011; Börzel & Risse 2007). Fourth is that globalisation is situated in debates as 
Westernisation or modernisation, particularly in its role in diffusing EU norms 
and practices during enlargement to aspirant member states (Jacoby & Meunier; 
2011). The last debate defines globalisation as deterritorialisation, or the 
transformation of national boundaries and social spaces.  
 
Although some scholars have tried to untangle the impact of globalisation and 
Europeanisation from one another, there is still space for further elaboration of 
these two aspects (Radaelli & Exadaktylos 2011). Some scholars have tried to do 
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this; particularly, quantitative measurements of investments, trade, and tourism 
have been key indicators. While it is conceptually difficult to untangle 
globalisation from Europeanisation, the present theoretical venture defines them 
differently to identify a precise angle to analyse the two without conflating one 
over another (Jacoby & Meunier 2011; Börzel & Risse 2007). Europeanisation, in 
this research, specifically deals with the EU Regulatory regime and membership. 
Through process tracing policy transformations during the pre- and post-
accession process, I use a different strategy to locate the distinct effects of the two 
from one another.  Conceptually, this is not an effort to end the debate between 
the two, but instead I attempt to contribute empirically to the discussion. 
 
1.1.4 Stepwise Comparison, Varieties of Capitalism, and State Size 
 
For literature on a step-wise comparison, and the general literature of varieties of 
capitalism, and state size, there have been many studies that used the same 
comparative approach to understand policy transformation in public utilities. In 
a special issue of Governance in 2006, David Levi-Faur argued that the varieties 
of capitalism and neoliberalism literature both had shortcomings in 
understanding contemporary capitalisms. Although both literatures have 
produced innumerable studies on our understanding of capitalism today, both 
have failed to grasp the transformation of the state in small and subtle ways. 
Levi-Faur argues that instead of a full retreat from governance, states went 
through a partial retreat to manage some functions while delegating others. As 
such, this phenomenon, he believes, is the varieties of regulatory capitalism. A 
series of works on liberalisation and independent regulation of public utilities 
followed in the publication. Ian Blaithe, intent on understanding the impact of 
EU membership on policy transformation worked on comparing Norway and 
Switzerland, while Humphreys and Padgett analysed these changes in two very 
reluctant states in liberalisation, France and Germany (Humphreys & Paddgett 
2006). For enlargement studies in particular, Levi-Faur and Jordana looked at 
Portugal and Spain to analyse the extent of policy transformation before and after 
membership. Studies done using the step-wise comparison allowed the 
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researchers to grasp the causal mechanisms that allow or hinder policy 
transformation. By looking at types of capitalism, the impact of globalising 
technologies, and the impact of state size, the stepwise comparison has been able 
to strengthen comparative analysis. This strength, I argue, should be applied and 
analysed in the context of newer member states.  
 
Although varieties of capitalism and state size will be reviewed at the case 
selections component of the next chapter, this section elaborates these concepts a 
bit more. For VoC, the focus on the interaction of firms, states, and labour 
unions, mainly on industrialising countries in the late 19th century, developed 
the VoC literature (Soederberg, Menz, Cerny 2005). At the moment, research on 
the VoC has been vastly developing across the globe−Southeast Asia, South Asia, 
and Latin America, specifically in newer member states, as well as in the post-
Soviet states of the Caucuses. The focus on these newer region-specific VoCs, 
however, seems to neglect public utilities as a whole (Levi-Faur; Bartle 2006; 
Soederberg, Menz, Cerny 2005).  
 
Literature on state size has focused on many different things. The International 
Relations strand is keen on understanding the conditions that allow small states 
to pursue an autonomous foreign policy (Toje 2010; Cooper and Shaw 2009). In 
particular, the literature focus on small state strategies, the popular notion of 
bandwagoning, also known as small states pooling their resources together, or 
succumbing to a bigger power, in the context of unforgiving foreign policy 
conditions (Toje 2010; Cooper and Shaw 2009). Other researchers look at the 
extent of small state cooperation and competition within international 
organisations, while others focus on the development of national institutions 
(Cooper and Shaw 2009). However, for my dissertation Peter Katzenstein’s 
flexible adjustment thesis is the most relevant. He argues that small states 
succumb to economic pressures from international organisations and 
transnational companies because of their weaker bargaining power−resources, 
population, and representation in international organisations (Toje 2010; Cooper 
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and Shaw 2009; Soederberg, Menz, Cerny 2005; Katzenstein 1985). As a 
response, many scholars came out to criticise this perceived vulnerability and 
instead argued that some small states successfully manage globalisation and 
economic pressure.  
 
1.1.5 Europeanisation of Estonia and Poland’s Public Utilities 
 
Specifically on policy transformation of Estonia’s electricity sector, there are two 
very detailed empirical works. Rurik’s Holmberg’s PhD on Survival of the Unfit: 
Path Dependence and Estonia’s Shale Industry; and also, the work of Madis 
Ehastu on the Europeanisation of Estonia’s electricity sector: historical legacies 
and security concerns. Holmberg traced the sticky feedback effect of previously 
made investment choices and uncertain security concerns to show that in spite of 
the high extraction and environmental cost of oil shale, the reliance on the 
unconventional resource is rational because the alternative is much more costly. 
On the work of Ehastu, his research is an empirical piece on the policy 
transformation of Estonia’s electricity sector. His strategy was to explain the 
limitations of the Europeanisation model and in its place use the historical 
legacies to explain policy transformation.  
 
There are two theoretical gaps from these works. First, theoretically, the focus on 
historical institutionalism was able to explicate the barriers put up by previously 
made decisions, the relationship and dynamics of parties in Estonia, and the 
decisions that the ruling party had to make in light of uncertain conditions. The 
limit of historical institutionalism, however, is that it becomes too sticky that it 
fails to explain institutional change (Hay 2001). Indeed, as explained in many 
variants of institutional literature, historical institutionalism seems to explain 
institutional change through ‘big bang’ changes—such as war, societal and 
ecological collapse, as well as chaos. Although some newer variants of the 
literature explain gradual institutional changes through smaller policy changes, 
the general weakness of HI seems coherent (Hay 2001). Second, for Ehastu, a 
newer elaboration of Europeanisation through Claudio Radeilli, Featherstone, 
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and Exadaktylos on ‘bottom-up’ approach has gained credence throughout the 
years. His argument on historical legacies, however, could have been more 
illuminating if such legacies were situated using theories of comparative 
institutions and capitalism. Put simply, the explanatory power of security and 
historical concerns are only as strong as other explanations fail to explain the 
same phenomenon.  
 
There have also been two ‘indirect’ studies that looked at Estonia’s energy sector 
but analysed different dimensions. Eric Seufert argues that liberalisation would 
result to price increase, which in turn would compromise energy security. Using 
rigorous mathematical models, Seufert calculated the extent of price increase if 
liberalisation takes place. Although this is neat, the focus on econometrics limits 
the analysis in understanding liberalisation as a whole—particularly, why and 
how would it take place. Although he did say that he would not focus on these 
questions, it brings up gaps to theory building. A work by Susan Verheijen 
focused on the EU’s impact on the Baltic States. Unlike Ehastu, Verheijen took 
into account bottom-up Europeanisation to explain policy transformation in 
Estonia. She argues that the failure of the EU to influence the Baltic States goes 
back to the persistence of national policies, which she defines as liberal 
integovernmentalism. The theoretical focus on national policies seems to be 
compelling. The problem lies, however, in the detachment of national policies on 
the broader political economy as a whole. In these matters, there appears to be 
little explanation given to policy changes such as small-scale liberalisation, 
renewable energy, and diversification.  
 
As a whole, with the exception of Holmberg, noticeable reliance on policy 
documents and secondary literature limits the authority of their empirical data to 
understand the pre- and post-accession context in Estonia. For instance, most of 
the materials came from the online published documents of the EU Commission, 
Estonian Ministry of Economy and Communication, and newspapers. The 
reliance on policy documents and secondary sources limits the capacity of the 
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research to draw from the perspective of actual policy makers from the Baltic 
States.  
 
In contrast to Estonia’s energy sector, there seems to be limited process-tracing 
research on policy transformation in Poland’s energy sector (Lewandoski; 
Skoczyny 2011). Although there are many studies written on the interaction of 
Poland and the EU regime in the energy sector, these studies focus on many other 
things: first, research on Poland focused on the Europeanisation of external 
energy policy, such as energy corridors–gas pipelines flowing from potential 
projects like Southstream–and not on the domestic energy generation; second, 
the abundance of Polish coal, the recent cutback, and privatisation have started 
occurring only recently; and third, Estonia’s ‘smallness’ could have given more 
opportunities to scholars to study the energy sector.  
 
From the international economics literature, there has been an abundance of 
works done on policy transformation in telecommunication (Olszynka; Harkmaa, 
Pirkko-Liis 2010; PAIZ 2006; Bruce, Kessides, and L. Kneifel 1999). Although 
most of these works are economic in nature and focused on the conditions for 
policy transformation in new member states, literature here has successful 
explained the reaction of new member states to the opportunities presented by 
globalisation to attract investments in. Telecommunication has often been said to 
be highly reactive to globalisation because of the desire of new member states to 
open up their economy. Since telecommunication is not just any sector, but a 
sector that connects local industries to the globalised market, a very open 
telecommunications sector could very well contribute to a state’s economic 
growth. This logic has been explained and understood in new member states 
(Olszynka; Harkmaa, Pirkko-Liis 2010). Research on telecommunication, 
however, has been constrained by the limited focus on the globalising aspect of 
the sector. Not only has little research been done to compare telecommunication 
with electricity, but there is also a clear lack of progress to situate the sector 
within national concerns and types of capitalism.  
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1.2 Theoretical and Methodological Issues 
 
What are the theoretical issues I want to raise from this rich and largely debated 
research track? The biggest problem would be to know if the EU indeed has an 
impact and if so, how do we measure this impact with as little bias as possible 
(Bulmer & Radaelli 2011, Exadaktylos & Radaelli 2009). Furthermore, the 
problem is not just with the EU, but it also concerns how international politics, 
which can or cannot be independent from the EU, affect national political 
systems (Gerring 2010, 2005). In this respect, rather than increase and specify 
EU-induced change, it is better to look into ‘spatial interdependence and cross-
country learning generate domestic change’ (Exadaktylos & Radaelli 2009: 23), 
which can vastly affect the findings of the study. Little has also been done on the 
impact of EU integration on member states over time (Bulmer & Radaelli 2011).  
 
An obvious issue but with little research is the link of transformation, reform, and 
compliance in the post-accession process (Egan 2011). Eight years after the 
accession of most countries in Central and Eastern Europe, there are many 
looming questions like the pace of transformation processes after accession and 
the learning or willingness capacities of new member states for political and 
institutional reform (Radaelli & Exadaktylos 2011). From a political economy 
perspective, a largely open track is to look at the impact of past legacies of the 
communist rule and networks on the modernisation efforts in CEE regional 
economies. To put it bluntly, are there emerging modes of capitalism relatively 
similar with more advanced economies (Egan 2011)?  
 
There are three theoretical contributions. First, while many studies of 
Europeanisation in the CEE focus on fiscal reform, foreign policy, environmental 
modes of protection, and party behaviour (Schulze 2010; Lasas 2008; Vachudova 
2005), I expand the focus on Europeanisation by not supposing its strong 
relationship on public utilities through a comparison with globalisation and state 
factors. My research focuses on the extent to which the reform of public utilities 
to promote market openness has been possible in the electricity and 
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telecommunication independent of the EU respectively. Both are ‘market-
oriented’, the political dynamics in these two countries have influenced the 
patterns of utility transformation. Although telecommunication was tied together 
with the Soviet regime’s security during the cold war, the sector became one of 
most liberalised areas in Estonia but not so much in Poland.  
 
Second, my research also contributes to literature on the effect of EU integration. 
The choice of Estonia and Poland does invite some questions in the 
establishment of causality. Estonia and Poland, new member states, were vying 
for membership until 2004, and have been doing its best to be a ‘good EU’ model 
ever since (Schulze 2010, Pridham 2007). Compliance, then, could very well stem 
from EU pressure on membership and compliance issues. While this critique is 
valid, it does little justice to the level of autonomy that Estonia and Poland had 
and still have in establishing the direction and form of its governance structures. 
Simply put, while the EU can push for minimum change, most especially at the 
new member states, it cannot account for modes and substance of change 
(Bulmer & Radaelli, Radaelli & Exadaktylos 2011). Political, politics, and polity 
changes are, after all, highly contested processes amongst political and economic 
actors (Radaelli & Exadaktylos 2011, Radaelli & Pasquier 2007).  
 
Third, to what extent does Europeanisation continue after EU accession? After 
eight years of EU membership, is it not time to analyse the extent of 
transformation in the newer member states? Like explained above, there has 
been too much emphasis, theoretically, on compliance before membership, while 
there has been little study on compliance after. Although there are some studies, 
these remain highly specific, just like the dissertation, and low in production. 
This point remains highly significant in a broader academic setting, because after 
eight years of membership, scholars of CEE are calling for a timely assessment of 
the EU’s past and present roles. There have been several important workshops 
and conferences. For instance, the University of Glasgow is coining the study of 
CEE after EU membership as ‘Post-Accession Studies,’ while the Centre 
international de formation européenne in Nice recently held a workshop on 
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Post-Accession Capacities of CEE. Therefore, the dissertation contributes 
modestly to this increasingly important and burgeoning academic trajectory. 
 
Methodologically, my research deploys the strengths of the step-wise comparison 
and the veracity of empirical material taken from semi-structured interviews with 
policy actors themselves. There have been many assumptions given in studies 
and in the media regarding the role of Europe in this regard, but as of yet, there 
has not been a study comprehensive enough to assess the impact of the EU by 
comparing it to another sector and another state. The method lends itself as a 
tool to increase the veracity of the analysis, as well as to compare the EU and 
domestic concerns with broader processes, such as globalisation and 
technological factors. Furthermore, most have relied on secondary information or 
data found in the Internet to explain policy transformation in Estonia. The 
existing data, I believe, is limited and it is crucial for new researchers to ‘dig’ what 
is happening in national capitals, government agencies, EU Directorate-Generals, 
and in Brussels (Egan; Jacoby & Meunier 2011; Börzel & Risse 2007). 
 
Furthermore, the timeliness of the study cannot be ignored because it deals with 
the highly controversial and salient energy sector (Umbech 2010), by comparing 
its changes through telecommunications and taking on a resource approach. To 
knowledge of the author, no study has analysed the steering capacity of the EU 
towards the utilisation and implementation of unconventional energy resources. 
In other words, the question explores the [re]construction of the energy sector 
trajectory in both states and its policy making elites as a result of learning 
through regulatory mechanisms of EU governance within the very unique context 
of the energy situation in supranational and national levels. Last, previous 
literature looked at VoC from the 1990s and the post-Cold War context; however, 
given EU membership and changes in globalisation, are there newer modes of 
VoCs? Although this is not the main query of the research, previous modes never 
applied VoC to utility regimes. If there are, what are its characteristics and how 
consistent are they with previous versions? 
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1.3 Theoretical Framework 
 
1.3.1 ‘Internalising Globalisation’ 
 
How are Europeanisation and globalisation used in my research? As explained in 
the introduction, if Europeanisation matters to a large extent, there should be 
four outcomes in the two policy sectors of Estonia and Poland. For CEE, the 
pressure for policy transformation should be at its strongest during the pre-
accession process: first, similar patterns of market integration, regulatory 
institutions, functions, and forms of governance (Humphreys & Padgett; Lodge & 
Stirton 2006); second, varying degrees of market liberalisation depending on the 
extent to which the specific European regime promotes it (Humphreys 2006)−in 
this case, a greater level of liberalisation for telecommunications and a lesser 
extent for energy; third, as Europeanisation moves further and deeper, lesser 
degrees of state support for national incumbents and entrenched interest 
(Humphreys and Padgett; Lodge & Stirton 2006); and last, new strategies of 
internationalisation by private firms, enabled by privatisation to invest, 
corresponding to the opportunities and constraints accompanying the progress of 
Europeanisation (Lodge & Stirton 2006). If outcomes are different, then, I argue 
that other factors explain policy transformation in new member states. 
 
While the standard hypothesis of explaining policy transformation goes back to 
the accession process and the EU regulatory regime, I argue, instead that there is 
a weak link between the EU and policy transformation in Estonia and Poland—
particularly, the transformation of markets and governance. I do this by using the 
following concepts. I posit the theoretical view of globalisation from the IPE 
literature, which argues that ‘broader’ homogenising features are taking place, 
but are limited by the unequal geographic articulations of wealth and global 
processes (Soederberg, Menz, Cerny 2005; Hay 2001). To define specifically what 
these processes are, I emphasise the convergence towards regulatory capitalism 
from public policy literature (Levi-Faur; Lodge & Stirton 2006), which posits the 
transformative role of the state in public utilities (Bartle; Humphreys & Padgett 
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2006), within the broader inclusion of Estonia and Poland in the world economy. 
Furthermore, to answer the form and extent of change in governance and 
markets, I argue that the type of capitalism and state size as organising logics of 
state management that shape policy transformation in the electricity and 
telecommunications sectors.  
 
As such, the variety of post-communist capitalism literature argues that Estonia’s 
radical neoliberalism and Poland’s embedded neoliberalism explain the extent of 
transformation in governance and markets. Although these expectations 
originate from previous works on other economic sectors of post-communist 
states, I posit that public utilities, with its distinctive and salient feature of 
infrastructure reliance, as well as multiple public policy goals of security and 
economic functioning, articulate short-term and long-term expectations that 
cannot be easily retracted by the state because of the sunk costs of infrastructure 
investments. Post-communist capitalisms alone, thus, cannot explain the extent 
of change in governance and markets, but are refracted by the imperatives of 
state dynamics found in state size. Following small state literature, Peter 
Katzenstein’s Flexible Adjustment belies that small states have less bargaining 
power and are thus more vulnerable to economic globalisation. However, as some 
have argued against such one sided focus, small states are able to resists such 
imperatives when faced with threats to state security, and the institutionalisation 
of state autonomy. These, I argue, can be found in Estonia’s ‘smallness’ and 
Poland’s emerging role in CEE regional security. Estonia’s small state features 
parlay a vulnerability to globalisation, a desire to capitalise on its location by 
transforming governance and market in telecommunications; but it has a need to 
protect the energy sector given its historical issues with Russia and 
infrastructural gas dependency. In contrast, Poland’s embedded capitalism and 
non-small state features explain the persistence of state autonomy in 
transforming governance and markets in telecommunications; similarly, the 
greater transformation of markets in the energy sector is explained by Poland’s 
management of globalisation, harnessing its opportunities. Notwithstanding the 
specificity of these cases, I argue that the consistency of both state capitalism and 
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state size as factors within the broader context of convergence toward regulatory 
capitalism explain the form and extent of change of governance and markets.  
 
1.3.2 Resource Geography 
 
I draw from resource geography. Although this is mainly used in the final 
theoretical chapter, the main point of resource geography is that resources 
matter; they exist in a constant dialogue with human kind. Resource geography 
has focused on questioning the nature and society divide, with an emphasis on 
why something is regarded as a resource and who benefits (Bridge 2010, 2009). 
Some of this work explores the fundamentality and contradictions of resource 
transformations in socio-technical systems, or people, processes, and products of 
existing institutions (Bridge 2010, 2009; Bridge and Bakker 2006). Whilst there 
are multiple transformations available for resources (Bridge and Bakker 2006), 
there are also challenges in focusing on emergent characteristics of resources, 
which are themselves historically co-produced by nature and society, to the 
reproduction of social-nature relations overtime (Bridge 2009; Bridge and 
Bakker 2006). The intensity of social-nature reproduction takes place in spaces of 
resource accumulation, connected across networks linked to global governing 
spaces (Bridge 2010ab; 2009). These spaces consolidate market accumulation 
through the expansion of governance onto other policy sectors, but more 
importantly direct the conduct of resource accumulation and indirectly 
administer social-nature reproduction (Peet, Robbins, Watts; Robbins 2011).  
 
Estonia and Poland are known for the existence of controversial unconventional 
energy, defined as energy sources not taken from the conventional source 
reservoirs (WEC 2009), which are known for highly inefficient and low yield 
resources. At the final empirical chapter, I compare the two unconventional 
energy sources−oil shale and shale gas−with one another, so as to show the 
influence of resources on policy transformation. In so doing, I expand the debate 
on Europeanisation and institutional transformation of the state beyond the 
junctures of old member states, public utilities, pre-accession of CEE countries. 
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Furthermore, by focusing on resources, I open the possibilities of comparison of 
resources.  
 
Thus, I argue that resources are not just technical or natural objects, but they 
represent social relations as well. In the context of Estonia and Poland, I argue 
that shale energy modifies the social relations of the state and society within, 
between, and amongst the international community. The key point is that 
resources modify the expectations and management of globalisation by 
harnessing the opportunities presented by unconventional energy. These may 
come as an opportunity for Estonia and Poland to be independent from Russia or 
for them to expand their influence in an international scale. Without positing 
finality on this on-going issue, but rather presenting a starting point of research 
for others, I argue that the distinctiveness of shale resources and its inconsistency 
with the broader EU regulatory regime present challenges to policy 
transformation.  
 
1.4 Summary 
 
The chapter reviewed the concepts directly relevant to the present research−most 
especially, Europeanisation and globalisation. While I define the former as the 
diffusion of a common political and economic order obtained through EU 
membership, also known as the EU regulatory regime, I define globalisation as a 
phenomenon towards market openness and convergence, which is also ‘bottom-
up, and inside out.’ This convergence, I believe, is found in the trend towards 
regulatory capitalism, which manifests in various forms and patterns across the 
globe. As I explained in the chapter, I do not intend to delve into the conceptual 
problem of the two terms; rather I will focus on the empirical contribution of 
highlighting the separate impact of the two concepts. Given this, the theoretical 
framework that globalisation is internalised by state actors and influenced by the 
type of capitalism and size of the state within a general process of convergence 
seems coherent. Furthermore, using resource geography, unconventional energy 
galvanises the opportunity of Estonia and Poland to harness the economic and 
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political opportunities of. As these countries are in the ‘margins’ of the EU, and in 
varying degrees threatened by Russian gas, unconventional energy modifies 
Estonia and Poland’s expectations and management of globalisation. In doing so, 
this two-prong strategy emphasises the criticality of globalisation. 
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CHAPTER 2 
METHODS FOR [PRIMARY] DATA COLLECTION 
 
 
2. Introduction 
  
The main analytical strategy of the dissertation is to trace processes in time to 
draw out causality in narratives, otherwise known as process tracing. Starting 
from the 1990s as a relatively arbitrary date for the policy shifts in the public 
utilities of both states, I trace policy transformation in the governance and the 
market of public utilities. By tracing the causes and effects of policy change 
within certain cases in time, process tracing allows a systemic empirical 
assessment of causality. 
 
2.1 Data Collection 
 
My methodological approach is qualitative and will employ a variety of research 
techniques in data collection and analysis. I conducted three separate field 
research periods in Tallinn, Warsaw, and Brussels, particularly at the offices of 
energy and telecommunications department, as well as the Directorate-General 
of Energy and Competition. I also interviewed private actors such as companies, 
and civil society, as well as public actors in the form of members from the major 
political parties of both states. Specifically, I intend to use the following 
techniques: 
 
1. Key informant interviews with state officials, consultants, business 
agents, EU Directorate-Generals, officials of political parties and 
stakeholders. This is the primary method because most policy documents 
are screened for political reasons. As many EU studies practitioners 
believe, no one actually knows what is going on in national capitals and at 
Brussels unless primary research is conducted (Egan 2011). Thus, this is 
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method aimed at acquiring perspectives on the impact of EU and other 
factors on policy transformation. Interviews with managers and executives 
of TNCs (telecommunications, Eesti Energia), working in coal and oil shale 
technologies at different levels of policy transformations at that time will 
provide insights as regards the strength of the link between the EU and the 
member states, competitiveness pressures of globalisation and policy 
sectors to companies. Furthermore, interviews with EU DGs were taken 
mainly to acquire the EU perspective and cross-reference the interviews 
from national officials. Interviews with political party officials and civil 
society to understand the institutional context of the state and the public. 
The major task is to show the links between the EU, policy transformation, 
and other, perhaps more plausible factors, as well as the political 
imperatives that follow.  
 
2. Policy and Archival Research. This is aimed at gathering important 
primary and secondary documents to support the claims or cross-
reference the interviews regarding policy transformation of energy and 
telecommunications. The data will include government documents in 
energy and telecommunications, key policy and NGO documents, strategy 
papers of government agencies, and business plans and annual reports of 
companies. 
 
2.2 Stepwise Comparative Design 
 
To demonstrate a theoretical point or to explain an empirical puzzle, the usual 
strategy is to use case studies. While case study types remain extremely 
important in knowledge production, they are limited by their focus on the 
generalisations that could be taken from a single case. As a result, following the 
common bias of positivism that causal inference can and should be demonstrated 
if the number of cases increase, the comparative method was crafted to tease out 
or to test the causal inference in more cases (Levi-Faur 2006; Wilson 1998). In 
regulatory and policy analysis, there were several strategies that comparative 
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analysis could employ: one is to test the same policies of a sector in two different 
countries (one sector, two country approach); another is to focus on one country 
but on two sectors with similar issues, say health and safety issues in one country 
(one country, two sector approach); or last, to look at the problems of a sector 
before and after policy change (Levi-Faur 2006).  
 
However, some scholars believe that this is not enough and a new strategy needs 
to be created (Levi-Faur a, b, c, 2006). David Levi-Faur argues that previous 
models of comparison, by subsuming the statistical logic to draw causality from 
social scientific research, have subsumed qualitative research under the 
quantitative wing. Such a strategy is a problem since not all problems are the 
same; some require an in depth analysis, while others give importance to more 
cases. Thus, two problems arise: one is that increasing the number of cases would 
redirect the attention of the researcher from an in depth analysis; and the other is 
that the strategy makes the same mistakes as the large N analysis. Statistics do 
not take into account the problem of case selection, particularly since the method 
assumes that all cases have the same predictive value and role in inferential 
processes−when in fact, they do not. 
 
Thus, to answer this issue, I use in my research Levi-Faur’s reworking of 
consilience. Broadly speaking, 'consilience' means the 'unity of knowledge,' or 
unification; but as expanded by William Whewell, the term ‘[inductions] takes 
place when an induction, obtained from one class of facts, coincides with an 
induction obtained from another class. Consilience is a test of truth of the Theory 
in which it occurs’ (Levi Faur 2006 c: 363). To exemplify the validity of a theory 
or an argument, increasing the number of cases does not necessarily demonstrate 
this; at best, it only shows that variables could be correlated to a particular 
outcome, but such a method does not demonstrate causality (Levi-Faur; Bartle; 
Lodge & Stirton 2006). Instead, increasing the number of tests on the same cases 
might reveal unconventional pathways or trajectories, strengthening the validity 
of one conclusion. For this research, a compound research design−two countries 
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and two sectors−following the stepwise comparison is used. The compound 
design compares two countries then compares the two sectors in the same 
country; from there, the design moves on to compare the same sectors in two 
countries, and finalises to compare the second sector in the two countries. 
However, this could still be furthered by adding a temporal dimension to analyse 
the sectors and nations before and after critical points, or temporally turning 
junctures (Bartle; Lodge & Stirton 2006).  
 
2.2.1 National Policy Comparison 
 
Why am I comparing Estonia and Poland? There is a common impression that 
the Central and the East European States (CEE) have a similar experience during 
their transition from the Soviet Union rule: popular resistance, a controlled 
economic system, and the 'return' to the West. These presumptions, however, are 
unsupportable when subjected to empirical research (Bohle & Greskovit 2007). 
While both are still new member states in the EU, Poland and Estonia are 
considered to be different in most important aspects (Schulze 2010; Lasas 2008; 
Bohle & Greskovit 2007). Estonia operates under a radical type of free market 
neoliberalism, the saliency of identity politics, and is seen as a small state (Bohle 
& Greskovit 2007). In contrast, Poland's embedded neoliberalism is different, the 
relative depoliticisation of identity, and is not viewed as a small state (Bohlee & 
Greskovit; Kuus 2007). The two member states also differ in their approaches on 
the developing 'partnership' with Germany and Russia. Both countries, however, 
have an abundance of shale resources−gas for Poland and oil shale for 
Estonia−and both have been the least energy dependent because of their huge 
reliance on their domestic resources.  
 
First, the type of capitalism or neoliberalism is vastly different. ‘Traditional’ VoC 
literature focused on the coordination of the market and labour unions, while 
newer forms analysed the interaction of neoliberalism and state capitalism. In 
assessing the 'veracity' of neoliberalism and the type of post-communist 
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capitalism, Bohle and Greskovits looked at the rate at which market forms were 
introduced and institutions were transformed by analysing data, taking from the 
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (ERBD) to acquire the 
proxy variable. Estonia operates under a radical type of free market neoliberalism 
(Bohle & Greskovit 2007), characterised by the relentless pursuit opening of 
markets, the liberalisation of services and trade, the introduction of competition, 
and the dissolution of social protection during the transition period. Estonia and 
two other Baltic States followed this trajectory until the end of the 90s, but were 
required by the EU to put in some level of protection and regulation in 
compliance to the accession requirements. Poland's embedded neoliberalism, a 
model followed heavily by Slovenia and the Czech Republic, results from 
experiences garnered from experimenting with 'reformed socialism' (Bohle & 
Greskovit 2007; Harvey 2005 & 2007). The decision to follow a certain type of 
neoliberalism could be traced back to the legacies and political economic 
situation at the time; The Baltic States relied on the Soviet Union for capital 
infusion, and when Soviet rule had to cease, there was a need to look for new 
sources of income (Schulze 2010; Lasas 2008). In contrast, Poland's historical 
economic and border linkages with the West European states proved to be 
reliable during the transition. 
 
Such difference could manifest in several ways. For instance, industrial 
transformation in Poland grew on average over the rate of industrial out vis-à-vis 
the deficit in Estonia (Bohle & Greskovit 2007). In early 2000, most exports of 
the Baltic States were unskilled workers from labor-intensive sectors, while 
Poland mainly relied on capital, technology and complex production of skills 
(Lasas 2008; Bohle & Greskovit 2007). The difference between the two economic 
strategies contributed to the unequal infusion of foreign direct investments (FDI) 
in the two countries, with Poland acquiring FDI ten times more than Estonia. 
During neoliberal restructuring, Estonia limited state intervention, protection 
and funding on the agricultural and manufacturing sector−as well as a shift of 
state focus on liberalisation. In Poland, knowing very well that a 'shock therapy' 
may have potentially chaotic consequences to the transition, the policy-making 
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elite decided to follow a gradual withering of the social welfare system. The 
institutionalised state-labour system allowed the Solidarity leaders to come up 
with schemes to minimise the damage of the transition through pension funds, 
minimum wage regulations, and a massive early retirement scheme (Bohle & 
Greskovit 2007). Thus given the discussion, the extent of neoliberalism and the 
type of capitalism vary between the two countries. 
 
Second, the extent of identity politics' saliency differs between the two states. 
While identity politics is a complex and long discussion, the point is to focus back 
on the issue of them joining the EU as an act prove their European roots−a 
prerequisite of their very existence and an indication of shared norms (Raun 
2009, Tiilikainen 2005, Kuus 2002). The decision of joining an international 
institution is not only because of security imperatives, but it is also because of 
informal rules, memories and ideas. As such, because of the migration to the 
Baltic States during the Soviet rule, identity was a major issue for 15 years; this 
influenced the type of capitalism and democracy of the two countries and 
sustained the majority support for the state, despite the exclusionary effects of 
neoliberalism. At the same time, identity politics also excluded the Russian 
speaking minorities, introduced restrictive citizenship laws and furthered an 
ethnic conception of democracy. In contrast, the lack of Russian migration and 
the compromise made to keep the USSR borders with Germany and the Czech 
Republic in the 90s (Synder 2004), made the issue more class than ethnic in 
nature. Thus, identity politics were much calmer in Poland than in Estonia. 
 
Third, the difference between a 'big state' and a 'small state' mattered as well. 
State size posits the importance of geographic location, population, and resources 
in influencing the relative autonomy of the state in economic matters, while 
others focus on the strategies of small states in preserving autonomy while facing 
bigger threats. Estonia's small state status represents a classic international 
relations power issue of dealing with bigger states and entities (Cooper & Shaw 
2009; Jones 2008), such as Russia and multinational companies, and capacity 
problems, such as resources, population and migration. In contrast, Poland is not 
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a super power or a great power, yet the state has been historically recognised as 
an active player in European affairs (Cooper & Shaw 2009). While it may not be a 
key player in the same rank as Germany and France, if conditions and politics 
bode well, Poland has the capacity to be a powerful EU player in the domains of 
energy, trade and security (Toje 2010). On the final level of difference, while it 
has been as tenuous as Estonia when it comes to energy, Poland's dealing with 
Russia has been relatively more pragmatic than Estonia in the last ten years 
(Cooper & Shaw 2009). In the Baltic States, and not just in Estonia, Russia has 
been clamouring for the fairer treatment of Russian speaking minorities, as well 
as competing for the politicisation of history (Ciuta; Kuus 2007) While shale gas 
might change the paradigmatic landscape of energy in the EU, Poland's approach 
and relationship toward Russia seems different from Estonia in the present. 
 
Given the differences between the two countries, the accession process is the 
unifying common factor of both states. Since the aim of the research is to show 
the weak link of Europeanisation and policy transformation, the common factor 
is appropriate since Estonia and Poland went through the accession process to 
become EU members; thus, transforming their domestic institutions and 
accepting policies specific to public utilities to become EU members. Therefore, 
the method of the most different case would be used. Since my main goal is to 
understand the EU's link on the public utilities of new member states, the 
method is appropriate because it can depict the similarity of outcomes in two 
vastly different political and social settings.  
 
2.2.2 Policy Sector and Resource Comparison 
 
However, even if national comparisons do make sense, does it make sense to 
compare policy sectors? In the literature, the policy sector comparison has gained 
traction in recent years. Popular sectors for analyses are water, postal services, 
rail, transportation, energy, and telecommunications. In theory, the extent of 
globalisation shapes the level of a sector’s liberalisation—a state might be more 
attracted to reforming a sector, which could yield higher, potential profit. Simply 
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put, the characteristics of the state and the nation, which come about in ideas, 
histories, memories, power relations, and political systems, influence the way 
capitalism takes place (Bartle; Humphreys & Padgett; Lodge & Stirton 2006). 
This idea, however, while very useful in comparing capitalism across cases, can 
be applied to different sectors such as trade, services, labour, and production 
(Levi-Faur a, b, c 2006). Since the research looks at network industries, a sector 
which require substantial investments on vertically integrated infrastructure to 
administer service, the national dimension is limited by the technological, 
scientific, and physical limitations; thus, the strategy to analyse national and 
state characteristics alone would be insufficient (Levi-Faur; Bartle; Humphreys & 
Padgett; Lodge & Stirton).  
 
Why are we comparing energy and telecommunications? By far, 
telecommunications and energy have been compared across Western Europe, as 
well as countries in Latin America. At face value, there are distinct characteristics 
between the two sectors. First, in contrast to energy, technological innovations in 
telecommunications were hastily achieved in the 1990s. Alternatives to existing 
and crucial materials for telecommunications were reached during the 
1990s−telephony for copper wires. Second, in contrast to electricity, 
telecommunications became cheaper to transmit to distant places at very low 
cost. Third, telecommunications became compatible with existing technology in 
other sectors. Radio at trains and electricity equipment became receivers of 
telecommunications frequency.  
 
However, what makes telecommunications and energy comparable is the idea of 
network industries. Broadly speaking, both sectors have their production, 
generation, and distribution infrastructures. The production and generation 
handles the creation of particular goods, while distribution mainly deals with the 
logistics work of bringing the goods to the customers. For both electricity and 
telecommunications, without the distribution, the capacity of the company to 
earn would be stifled. Hence, most private or state-owned companies integrate 
the three parts of telecommunications and energy together under one dominant 
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company. In this case, what makes telecommunications and energy comparable 
would be the prerequisite to break up the integration of distribution from 
production and generation to enable competition and privatisation to come in. 
Most energy and telecommunication companies until the 1980s were state 
controlled or were under the state company. The distribution component was 
connected to the other ones as well. In this case, if a competitor wants to come in, 
the integration of the distribution to the incumbent would be a discouragement 
to the investors, as there is a fear of incumbent’s abuse of power. Thus, to bring 
about competition, the EU right now is pushing for the ‘unbundling’ of 
distribution from other parts of the network−in telecommunications in the 1980s 
and 1990s, and in energy today. While I do agree that in terms of market, 
competition laws, capacity for private ownership, telecommunications and 
energy do differ a lot, comparison is still possible due to the similar logics in this 
case.  
 
Specific to the final chapter, from the perspective of critical geography, Bridge 
argues that resources are not simply physical materials, but are also social 
themselves. There are, then, social relations with resources, which people usually 
occlude when they talk about resources. These social relations include working 
conditions of the workers, the access and resource frontiers of extraction, the 
revenue, rent, and regulation created, the ecological costs of extraction, and lastly 
the materialities of resources. Coming from this perspective, primarily, the 
dissertation argues that resources can also be valid point of comparators from a 
perspective of ‘stepping up.’ These objects have their own materialities, exert 
their influence, and can change the way institutions work. While not succumbing 
to geopolitical, geographical determinism, or object fetishism, the dissertation 
argues that they produce outcomes within and beyond the state. 
 
There are issues in comparing oil and gas in conceptual and methodological 
terms. On conceptual terms, the oil and gas sectors are usually considered 
different in literature. While both are energy resources, on the one hand, oil is 
more flexible and it is subjected to the world market; it has also been subjected to 
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numerous politicisation (Proedrou 2011). On the other hand, gas is regionally 
located and its mobility is limited by infrastructure; historically, it has been less 
politicised. Since the research looks at the energy sector, specifically coal, oil 
shale, and shale gas in their respective sectors, it could be very well argued that 
these are different sectors to begin with. The problem with this perspective, 
however, is that it ignores the utilisation, convertibility and infrastructure 
requirements of oil and gas. While they are two different resources, they are both 
used in industries, heating, transportation, and other domains. Both sectors 
require huge amounts of investment in infrastructure, conversion and in the case 
of oil, storage.  
 
On methodological terms, the comparison between the two seem untenable 
because shale extraction started only recently in Poland. Shale gas extraction only 
started in 2010 and presently, there are only two operational shale gas wells 
managed by the global oil company, Exxon Mobile (Wierslaw; Shaoul 2011). 
Given this situation, it could be argued that a comparison of policy 
transformation between shale gas and oil shale is not possible since the two 
resources do not go through the same EU-led processes. However, to overcome 
this hurdle, only the final chapter focuses on the endeavour of both states to 
harness the potential of globalisation in unconventional shale energy. Thus, an 
analysis of the Polish and Estonian energy sectors begin by comparing Polish coal 
and Estonian oil shale in the public utilities chapter; and when shale gas became 
a salient issue in 2010, the research focuses on comparing shale strategies in the 
final empirical chapter. Given the strategy, I expect to see a relatively 
convergence of Polish and Estonian resistance to EU processes when the viability 
of unconventional energy resources came about−reinforcing the very hypothesis 
of this research that policy transformation could be better explained by the state’s 
internalisation of globalisation.  
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2.3 Scope and Limitations 
 
First, the dissertation looks only at selected aspects of energy, electricity, and 
telecommunications. For instance, the dissertation does not deal with energy 
efficiency issues, particularly the upgrading of buildings and commercial 
materials to promote greater energy efficiency in the new member states, as well 
as other directives related to combustion and infrastructure requirements, a huge 
part of energy that remains relatively untouched. Neither does the research look 
at the history of these utilities and resources; nor does it look at the transposition 
of every EU law on these sectors. There have been studies before in that regard. 
There are many unexplored aspects in energy, which includes the transformation, 
mergers and the acquisitions of the production and distribution plants. There are 
many untouched aspects in telecommunications as well, which includes the 
development of mobile telephones, Internet, and other web related features. 
These are no doubt important, and studies could yield many interesting new 
ideas, but they are not the main concern of the dissertation. Second, the political 
process is explained by looking at the macro-level of EU and institutions, and 
inevitably party politics, civil society, institutional development, and coalition 
politics, foreign policy security are relatively occluded in the narrative. Third, at 
the onset of the research, the study does not deal with Russian Gas because it is a 
‘constant variable’ in that regard, and to that extent, the dissertation only deals 
with foreign policy when it needs to. 
 
2.4 Summary 
 
This chapter explained the data collecting techniques and comparative research 
design. For the data, I highlighted the importance of acquiring semi-structured 
interviews. Since the topic deals with the impact of the EU, the energy security, 
the divide between supranational regimes and national goals, and the conflict 
over unconventional energy, policy documents are limited by the nature of their 
production.  Policy documents, however, remain integral to the research as a 
form of support or counter evidence to the interviews. The chapter, then, 
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explained the research design following the stepwise comparative method. As I 
argued, this comparative method is best utilised in analysing units with 
technological specificity. In doing so, the method draws out the causal processes 
from research units using different dimensions of analysis. At the end of the 
chapter, I explained that there is an extended focus on utilities on resources 
specifically. In doing so, I focus on understanding the processes that resources 
help create. The cases of Estonia and Poland were chosen due to their vastly 
different characteristics in state size and type of capitalism, two factors that are 
considered extremely salient in public utilities. This strategy points out that if the 
causes for the policy transformations in both governance and markets for both 
countries are the same, then it is plausible to have a generalisable case that the 
EU’s influence is weak.  
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CHAPTER 3 
 
UTILITY REGIMES IN ESTONIA AND POLAND 
Comparing the EU European Regulatory Regime 
 
3. Introduction 
 
This research started by questioning the relationship of the EU with policy 
transformations in the public utilities of CEE. Since Europeanisation and 
globalisation have pushed somewhat similar pressures on states, the interesting 
question becomes: which of these pressures made Poland and Estonia transform 
their public utilities? In the first chapter, I emphasised the use of a theoretical 
framework that combines types of capitalism and state size to explain each state’s 
internalisation of globalisation. In the second chapter, I justified the case choices 
of Estonia and Poland using the most different case design and argued for the 
importance of using the stepwise comparative method. The stepwise method, 
utilised diachronically and fuelled by semi-structured interviews to tease out the 
most relevant recent information, can draw out the important causal mechanisms 
that transform the governance and markets of public utilities. 
 
Thus, to test the theoretical framework of the argument using the proposed 
methods, I argue in this empirical chapter that the link between policy 
transformation and the EU influence is weak. Instead, the type of capitalism and 
state size are organising logics of policy transformation, which largely influence 
the extent and form of market and governance shifts. The EU provided pressure, 
but it cannot account for policy transformation and the institutional forms taken 
after. Although the accession was a powerful process to change institutions, were 
there other reasons for transposing these laws? Were these laws implemented 
and followed?  
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The chapter is structured as follows. First, I begin with a comparison of EU-level 
regulatory regimes in telecommunications and energy, establishing the varying 
levels of pressure by two different EU regulatory regimes. Second, I look at 
telecommunications and energy regimes in both countries before their respective 
accessions to EU membership. In doing so, the design increases the consilience of 
the comparison by comparing both nations and sectors. Third, I again compare 
the EU regulatory regime in both sectors. After an assessment, the final step 
looks at the two regimes in both countries after 2004.  
 
3.1 EU Regulatory Regime in Energy and Telecommunications before 2004 
 
The starting point is that public utilities have historically been subjected to 
intervention by the state and state-led firms. Due to a number of factors−which 
included a shift of economic (ideological) paradigms, the development of 
telecommunications technology, and the expansion of globalisation in several 
parts of the world−telecommunications development at the EU level took a 
different turn in the 1980s (Eikeland; Thatcher 2011; Levi-Faur 2006). Even 
before the advent of the Single European Act in 1986 and the rise of Thatcher’s 
and Reagan’s neoliberal regimes, there were already gradual shifts from a highly 
state-controlled network industry to an open international one. In the United 
States, the divestiture of American Telephone and Telegraphy, the privatisation 
of Cable and Wireless British Telephony in the United Kingdom, and the 
shareholder changes in Nippon Telegraphy Telephone in Japan made 
economically significant parts of the world more closely connected (Eikeland 
2011). At the EU level, the 1986 directorate for telecoms was established with the 
aim of expanding and promoting the liberalisation of the sector (Eikeland; 
Thatcher 2011). 
 
Small changes started. First, the publication of the Green Paper on the 
liberalisation of telecommunications equipment and services in 1987 became an 
important landmark, as the document provided official reports on the 
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effectiveness of a liberalised telecommunications sector across the world 
(Bireselioglu; Eikeland 2011). In doing so, after the formal recognition of the EU 
Commission’s responsibility over the single market in 1986, the EU started to 
publish regulatory initiatives such as the Open Network Provision (ONP), a 
crucial directive for the convergence of access conditions for telecommunication 
networks and services. Such directives allowed value-added markets to open, 
excluding basic telephone services, which remained full monopolies of member 
states (Bartle; Humphreys & Padgett 2006). At the start, many member states 
strongly resisted. The distributional conflict over utility liberalisation was taken 
to the European Court of Justice, which ruled that the Commission had primary 
jurisdiction on this particular issue. Upon the ruling, France and Germany−the 
main opponents of liberalisation−started to endorse the liberalisation of 
telecommunications (Bartle; Humphreys & Padgett 2006). Even so, debates at 
the EU level did not end. The Commission published four more Green Papers 
between 1990 and 1996, aiming to gradually liberalise various aspects of 
telecommunications; for instance, before 1999, the focus of liberalisation was on 
value-added markets in terminal equipment, services, and satellites.  
 
Although with various state-specific exceptions, there were two big shifts in the 
EU Telecoms regime. First, on 1 January 1998 all EU member states agreed to 
open voice telephony, a major and the largest part of the market, to free 
competition (Humphreys and Padgett 2006). Second, the EU 2002 
Telecommunications directive, which had five important provisions directly and 
indirectly related to the governance and markets of telecommunications−the 
Framework Directive, Access, Universal, and e-Privacy. The 2002 Directive also 
created the European Regulators Group to handle harmonisation and 
cooperation among telecommunications regulators.  
 
In contrast, the European Energy regime evolved slowly and differently. Although 
at the start, the similarities between energy and telecommunications appeared 
much clearer. One of the earliest institutions in Europe dealt with energy, in the 
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form of the European Atomic Energy Community, as well as the Directorate-
General of Energy [DG Energy], which was created in 1968. The availability of 
cheap oil, insecurities over energy supplies, and powerful intergovernmental 
forces in the EU led to the stagnation of community competence in the sector 
(Young 2011; Goldthau & Witte 2010). Although energy had traditionally been 
under the auspices of member states, community competence developed in the 
early 90s due to other simultaneous developments, such as the Single Market 
Act [SEA], liberalisation in telecommunications, and the embedding of 
neoliberalism in key member states−leading to similar generative pressures for 
regulatory and liberalisation in the sectors (Eikeland; Thatcher 2011; Levi-Faur 
2006). 
 
The earliest energy regulatory regime was formalised in the form of the EU 
directive 96/92/CE, which took the form of introducing competition in the 
electricity and gas markets; although it had support from some states, such as the 
United Kingdom and Netherlands, it was vehemently resisted by most member 
states (Proedrou 2012; Bireselioglu 2011). The Commission and DG Competition 
thought that they could mandate liberalisation via competition laws developed in 
the 1990s, similar to what happened in telecommunications; however the result 
of the Almeno Case ruling of the European Court of Justice pushed the 
liberalisation question into the margins (Proedrou 2012; Eikeland 2011). Thus, 
EU directive 96/92/CE is mostly a product of a Franco-German alliance aimed at 
pursuing gradual, state-directed liberalisation (Bireselioglu; Eikeland 2011). With 
the realisation that any top-down measure would be politically impossible, the 
EU Commission decided to take a bottom-up approach by introducing the second 
liberalisation package, which mainly took the form of informal, network 
interactions by member state officials, non-state actors, and EU Commission 
members. Thus, 2003/54/CE on the 26th of June 2003, the second liberalisation 
package was formulated with the main goal of further unbundling and 
empowering energy regulators, as well as creating transparency in tariffs and 
service regulations (Eikeland 2011; Umbach 2010). The limited effectiveness of 
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the second energy package has been well documented by many reports, having 
limited impact on largely concentrated electricity and gas systems.  
 
In summary, telecommunications was much more supranational than electricity 
because of investment necessities and global developments in technology. At the 
EU level, the support given by the ECJ to the EU Commission to stand against 
violators of EU regimes was significant. Energy, on the other hand, remained 
weak despite the political salience of the issue. Energy remains largely 
intergovernmental, and the alliances of EU member states remain strong in this 
field. Therefore, the difference between the two regimes will likely lead to 
difficulty in transforming governance and markets in energy. Indeed, as some 
officials in the EU lament, the third package’s success has thus far been limited 
(DGE 2012). Although the accession factor impacts both sectors, given all of these 
factors, the literature expects that governance and markets telecommunications 
should be easier to transform.  
 
While the technological disparity would apply to the rest of the world, there are 
two notable exceptions in CEE. In contrast to old member states, these 
developments were taking place during the accession process of CEE. Literature 
has already established that the accession period made state leaders in CEE 
transform their domestic institutions in the biggest ever show of the EU’s foreign 
policy influence (Schulze 2010; Lasas 2008; Bohle & Greskovit 2007). Thus, 
while the question of post-accession influence is still up for debate, the EU’s 
impact before the accession should be strong due to the acquis. Another 
difference is that multiple outside organisations were pushing for the 
liberalisation of telecommunications−the OECD, the WB, WTO, and major 
economies such as Japan. 
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3.1.1 Telecommunications Regime in Estonia and Poland before 2004 
 
In most of the Soviet Bloc, technological developments in telecommunications 
were neglected due to a number of reasons, which included the ideological 
competition of the time. The Cold War had led states to focus on military instead 
civilian needs. While local telephone control was left to the local officials, long-
distance goals had to be inspected by Soviet authorities (Bruce, Kessides, and L. 
Kneifel 1999). This had clear implications during the 1990s. Nonetheless, even if 
the telecommunications sector in Estonia at that time had these conditions, 
infrastructure stability and service distribution were at their highest levels in the 
Soviet Union—for instance, in 1975 there were fully automated telephones, and 
by 1985, the country had 112 telephones per 1000 capita (OECD 2002). 
Conversely, Poland had one of the worst telecommunications infrastructures. In 
10,000 villages, most had no access to telephones and usually only the mayor had 
a telephone line (OECD 2002). In urban areas, only one out of four homes had 
access; while in the rural areas, it was one out of thirty (OECD 2002). 
 
Under complete Soviet control, the public telecommunications system was 
sequestered under the new republic-level Ministry of Communications, which 
was under the full jurisdiction of the Supreme Soviet of the Estonian SSR and to 
the Ministry of Communications in Moscow. Under this regime, there were 
several important points. First, the choice of communications equipment and 
project designs were left under the control of the ‘Project and Construction of the 
Ministry of Communication.’ Most of the technologies developed during this time 
were for the goal of maintaining a stable and predictable system. Second, since 
the management of communication was directly linked to the oversight of 
information, the top brass managers and high-level engineers were thoroughly 
screened and controlled by Moscow (Bruce, Kessides, &. Kneifel 1999). However, 
due to its expertise, the ministry in Estonia seemed to have kept a certain amount 
of autonomy from Moscow. This was because the entire telephone system had 
pre-war administrative requirements and technological specificities, leading to 
the participation of major telecommunication companies. Although they 
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withdrew during the Soviet period, companies such as Ericsson were already 
operating as early as the 1930s due to the advantageous location and size of the 
country (Bruce, Kessides, &. Kneifel 1999). Local companies such as Poogelmann 
and Kalinin were integrated on a larger scale and became part of a broader 
system (OECD 2002). These developments gave way to the effective liberalisation 
and reregulation initiatives of the 1990s. 
 
At the end of the Soviet period, the increasing level of autonomy given by the 
Soviet Union resulted in, initially, plans for economic independence and self-
sufficiency. As such, these led to an increasing desire to begin cooperation with 
foreign firms, which was allowed by Moscow by 1987. At the start of 
independence, the first move taken was the liquidation of the Ministry of 
Communications, followed by the demotion of the state to a minor role in the 
national economy. For telecommunications to become profitable, the 
modernisation of infrastructure was needed. Since the Soviet Union had been the 
biggest provider of capital, accounting for infrastructure functioning, services, 
and development, the newly independent state had to draw capital from foreign 
investors. Hence, the Telecommunications Act of 1991 was legislated, a law that 
above all was inspired by the success of the Swedish and Finnish 
telecommunication industry (Harkmaa 2010; Bruce, Kessides, &. Kneifel 1999), 
and no Western or EU participant was reported in the legislation phase. 
Furthermore, a step distinct from the rest of the former Soviet satellites was the 
separation of telecommunication infrastructure from the rest of the USSR—
motivated by, as a whole, the desire to establish mobile telecommunications with 
Sweden and Finland (ETO 2012; Bruce, Kessides, &. Kneifel 1999).  
 
As early as 1991, privatisation began Estonia, and one of the main goals of the 
process was to enhance, develop, and provide a mobile communications network 
and service in Estonia (Sallai, Schimideg, Lajtha 1999). The Estonian Mobile 
Telephone Company was formed by an international joint venture led by 
Estonian Telecom [51%], Finnish Telecom [24.4%] and Swedish Telecom [24.5%] 
(OECD 2002). As long-distance calls and competences in the Soviet Union were 
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not developed properly, the involvement of established companies allowed 
Estonia to acquire private capital and develop the necessary competitive 
infrastructure far earlier than post-Soviet states. Since international 
telecommunication companies provided cheaper access to infrastructure upgrade 
and institutional partnership for incumbent companies the region (Harkmaa 
2010), Estonia was one of the earliest states to capitalise on these offers. 
Telephone services that included telephone, telex, and telegraph were initially 
given to the full monopoly of the Estonian Telephone Company until 2000. The 
agreement gave time for the Estonian government to gradually decrease subsidies 
for local services while also giving a sense of certainty to foreign investors.  
 
For independent regulation, the Estonian government and parliament proposed 
arrangements for the creation of an independent regulatory body (Harkmaa 
2010; Lithuania Seminar 2005). The law proposed the Estonian National 
Communications Board [NCB], led by its director general, which had full 
independence from any political manoeuvres, electoral instability, and vested 
interests. The independent regulatory body is in charge of pricing policies, 
competition rules, accounting checks, and regulatory harmonisation (Bruce, 
Kessides, and Kneifel; Sallai, Schimideg, Lajtha 1999). For sector regulation, the 
Estonian Telecommunications Inspectorate was created; they were given the 
power to distribute radio frequencies. The Ministry of Communications’ 
ownership decisions were transferred to state-owned ‘Eesti Telekom’ and ‘Eesti 
Post,’ while the regulatory powers of the Ministry of Telecommunications was 
transferred to ENCB. These trends continued as on January 1 of 2001, the 
government of Estonia opened the entire country to full competition and 
implemented a new law on a new regulatory framework (Sallai, Schimideg, 
Lajtha 1999). 
 
With the passage of the Telecommunications Law in 1991, the Polish government 
transferred the Ministry of Communications’ control to state-owned 
Telekomunikacja Polska [TPSA] for telecommunications and Pocza Polska for 
postal services. The law only allowed competition in local calls to ensure the 
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infrastructural advantage of the TPSA. Ownership of the company was divided 
within the Ministry of Economy. Foreign firms and the US government objected, 
and the ensuing discussion resulted in a 49% foreign ownership of TPSA. There 
were also big problems regarding competition (PTO 2012). A big concern for 
TPSA was the tariff-rebalancing process between local and international calls, 
which taxed foreign telecommunication companies operating in the latter. Given 
its advantage in telecommunication infrastructures, the TPSA had little 
inclination to rebalance the tariffs. Specifically, the TSPA obstructed 
recommended liberalisation initiatives by halting pricing reforms, turnkey, and 
lease financing (PTO 2012; Olszynka 2011). The TPSA required a significant 
realignment of its local prices; it may not have perceived that there was a highly 
significant long-term advantage to pushing for rebalancing. If rebalancing took 
place, new competitors would have been given an advantage (Sallai, Schimideg, 
Lajtha 1999). Even though the Polish government decided to permit ‘fairer’ 
competition in long distance services on 1 January 1999, all the other 
international services delayed opening to competition (Olszynka 2011).  
Similarly, the effectiveness and implementation of independent regulation was 
questionable (ETO 2012; Olszynka, P. 2010). While it was accepted that 
independence must be given to the new regulatory agency, there was the question 
of to what extent and whether to delegate the powers of the ministry into two 
organisations—one dealing with competition and licensing, and the other 
handling regulatory responsibilities for telecoms (PTO 2012; Olszynka, P. 2010; 
Sallai, Schimideg, Lajtha 1999). The Polish Competition and Consumer 
Protection Office (UOKiK) handled the former, (Sallai, Schimideg, Lajtha 1999), 
while The Polish Office of Telecommunication Regulation (URT) handled the 
latter.  
 
There were also delays in preparing for the licensing of new entrants. Before the 
accession process, the Ministry of Economy did not have any intention to provide 
licences for the providers of long distance services, those who had technological 
and contact advantage over TPSA (DGC 2012; Bruce, Kessides, and Kneifel 1999). 
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The UOKiK, instead, created a time-consuming transition process that resulted in 
two to three dominant producers. Furthermore, the utilisation of the same 
distributional infrastructure for TPSA was limited in several ways— requiring 
service providers to have bureaucratic authorisation, various levels of confusing 
rules, and inconsistency with rulings. Licenses to local companies with 
questionable financial backings were issued on a regular basis. Such problems 
limited foreign investments in Polish infrastructure, which had a penetration of 
only 32% of consumers in the whole country in 1999 (DGC 2012; Bruce, Kessides, 
and Kneifel 1999). 
The URT’s head was an outside candidate of the ministry chosen by the Prime 
Minister (Stefanowicz & Dmyterko 2011); however, the new body was very much 
dependent on officials within the Ministry of Economy and those with strong, 
personal ties with TPSA and the Polish telecoms sector. The new agency faced 
legal and institutional uncertainty until 2003; they were intended to provide for 
the regulation through appointment by the Polish Prime Minister for a five-year 
term. Even before the actual accession into the EU, Polish competition 
authorities intervened, placing a heavy hand on setting prices for future sectoral 
arrangements (ETO 2012; Sallai, Schimideg, Lajtha 1999).  
 
3.1.2 Energy Regime in Estonia and Poland before 2004 
 
As part of the Soviet Union’s Northwest Electricity system, Estonia was part of 
the interdependent infrastructure, which included Russia, Belarus, Latvia, and 
Lithuania (Ehastu 2011; Holmberg 2006). In terms of electricity, the most unique 
characteristic of the Estonian energy sector is its reliance on oil shale—first 
developed in 1919, which then evolved into a bigger sector come World War II 
and the Post-war Period  (Ehastu; Molis 2011; Holmberg 2006). In Poland, the 
electricity sector has mostly been reliant on coal and, similar to Estonia, most of 
the gas came from Russia. An organisation called the ‘’Energy and Lignite Coal 
Community’ enabled the state’s monopoly on producing and regulatory decisions 
(Skoczyny 2011). However, for the entire Soviet period, the regulation and 
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development of the sector was under Moscow’s command. When Poland and 
Estonia entered the world market in the 1990s, the whole sector was completely 
state-centered, monopolised, and concentrated (Ratyńska 2011). 
 
In terms of liberalisation, the desire for privatisation was common in post-
communist states, there was a flurry of liberal policies and market mechanisms in 
both countries. Before EU negotiations started, the Estonian government pushed 
for radical market policies. In Estonia, it came in the form of the privatisation 
agency in 1993, which led the sales of previously owned government enterprises 
to foreign investors. The Supreme Council of Estonia inherited most of the 
regulatory powers in the sector, and there were unrealistic plans for restructuring 
and reinvestments. Although most of the companies and smaller businesses in 
other sectors were privatised as early as 1991, energy in the form of the state-
owned ensured the state’s dominant role in the sector. However, when the 
accession negotiations started, Estonia had to comply with liberalisation; thus, in 
1997, the energy act was formulated and passed in the parliament, and it had 
important implications on the regulation and liberalisation. The heated debates 
in privatisation allowed the restructuring of the oil shale complex and the 
transformation of RE Eesti Energia into a majority holding company, with several 
major producing and transmission companies (Ehastu 2011). The Estonian 
government tried to privatise a significant minority stake (49%) of the power 
stations at Narva to an American energy company, but the government eventually 
withdrew its support for the scheme because of a fierce resistance from Eesti 
Energia and some members of the academia (Ehastu 2011).  Although some 
smaller distribution companies were sold to market hands, privatisation was an 
issue because of the potential to price security, and further social consequences. 
As Einari Kisel said, people still remember the time when the Russian Federation 
shut off some of the gas deliveries in 1993, which resulted in a very cold and 
harsh winter. Even with continuous restructuring up to 2004, 90% of the 
electricity produced in Estonia was made from oil shale (Punison 2007; 
Holmberg 2006), a one-of-a-kind in the world, which was managed by Eesti 
Energia—which at the time had ‘480,000 private customers and over 22,000 
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corporate consumers’ (Punison 2007). However, due to the amount of 
investments needed for full restructuring, following the Directive 2004/84 of the 
ECJ, ‘Estonia was granted temporary derogation from the application of Article 
21 and Directive 2003/54 until December 2012’ (Punison 2007). The ECJ, 
however, mandated that partial competition begin on 1 January 2009 (Vaks 
2012).  
 
In the area of institutional regulatory structure, even before the actual accession 
period, as part of the negotiations with the EU, Estonia started to implement 
measures designed to follow the direction of EU’s economic model (Kisel; 
Reinaste 2012). Through the Energy Act, two very important regulatory agencies 
under the Ministry of Economic Affairs: the Estonian Energy Market 
Inspectorate [EMI] was established in 1998−which was in charge of energy 
competition, licensing, and price regulation−and the Estonian Surveillance 
Authority [ESA], which had to deal with inspection (Ehastu 2011). However, 
these two agencies had to share its powers with the Estonian Competition board, 
which had regulatory jurisdiction in all other sectors.  
 
Polish energy also held a monopoly during the cold war years. In Poland, 
privatisation initiatives started as early as the 1990s, the power industry districts 
were liquidated as in 1989 and coal and electricity sectors were separated (URE 
2011). The Polish reduced its control on the energy sector, tried to introduce 
competition, gave autonomy to production and distribution structures, and 
separated some transmission companies the vertical core (Lewandoski; Skoczyny 
2011). By 2002, four of the largest system powers and electricity distribution 
companies, as well as several local heating plants, have been distributed to 
foreign investors. The division of the power industry into distribution, 
transmission, and generation was a relative success (URE ;Skoczyny 2011). 
 
However, competition and majority ownership were still in the hands of the four 
biggest oligopolistic energy groups—Polskie Sieci Elektroenergetyczne [PGE], 
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Enea, Energa, and Tauron. Major companies such as the state-owned PGE 
retained their dominant positions in the market, while the state at least owned 
51% of Enea, Energa, and Energetyka Południe S.A (URE; Mordwa 2011). While 
PGE was established in 1990 as part of the ‘restructuring’ during the Soviet years, 
there were no significant operational changes as the state owned majority of the 
company and remained the largest power producing company in Poland (URE; 
Skoczyny 2011). Overall, Polish trade unions tried to block privatisation due to 
the fear of unemployment, but they were only partially successful.  
 
Institutional regulation changed as early as the 1990s in Poland. Although the 
UOKiK had the jurisdiction of competition, most of the regulatory powers specific 
to energy were delegated to the Energy Regulatory Office [URE]. Called the 
sector-specific regulatory model in the literature, and similar to Oxgas or Oxgen 
of the United Kingdom, wherein single regulatory institutions handle a particular 
sector, the URE was created in 1997, partially as a response to and a product of 
the European negotiations (Reinaste; Vaks 2012). The head of the URE is the 
President, appointed by the head of the ministry and independent from the 
Parliament, who possesses the sole capacity of having the ultimate decision on 
regulatory matters accorded by Polish law (Ratyńska 2012); these powers include 
energy trade in contract, balance, and exchange market (PPM 2012; Skoczyny 
2011).  
 
In summation, for both regulatory institutions in Estonia and Poland, the main 
responsibilities include price and tariff settings, investment decisions, as well as 
mergers and acquisitions. Members of both institutions also participated in 
transnational networks, such as the Florence Initiative and the Madrid protocol, 
even before the EU membership (Kisel 2012). In both cases, gradual market 
mechanisms were introduced. 
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3.1.3 Summation and Comparing across Nations and Sectors before 2004 
 
Since telecommunications was and still is the interconnection of many other 
sectors, attracting foreign investors was done best by privatising 
telecommunications (Lithuania Seminar 2005; Bruce, Kessides, and Kneifel 
1999). Thus, businesses came in during the 90s and when telecommunications 
developed at the start of the decade, the sector became the key for the efficient 
and relentless operation of the private sector (Lithuania Seminar 2005; Bruce, 
Kessides, and Kneifel 1999). The smallness of the Estonia, as well as the expertise 
that it had before the Cold War allowed the sector to be privatised and liberalised 
during the 1990s. The location of the country at near the Baltic Sea allowed 
Scandinavian countries to have a trading hub the rest of the mainland. Thus, not 
only because of the expertise, but also the existence of very willing neighbours 
able to finance the project. 
 
On the flip side, the federal nature of Polish governance, size of the country, and 
the sparse telecommunication infrastructures limited the impact of privatisation 
and liberalisation. The Polish economy was known to be an embedded capitalism, 
which fostered a relatively slower pace through the gradual implementation of 
market policies and the slower reduction of guaranteed state employment. 
Initially, the Polish government wanted a full control of the sector, but the 
intervention of American companies allowed minority foreign ownership in 
TPSA. There were generative pressures for privatisation, but infrastructure at 
that time was limited, and upgrades were needed due to the size of Poland (PTO 
2012 Stefanowicz & Dmyterko 2011). Poland’s incumbent telecommunications, 
along with their allies in the state, halted and pushed for ‘controlled privatisation’ 
by impeding competition in long-distance calls and delaying the licensing of 
newer entrants in the sector; hence, ensuring their advantageous position in 
competition (PTO 2012).  
 
In energy, Estonia was very reluctant to privatise. This is most probably due to 
the issue of energy security at the time, institutional experience, and state size 
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facilitated the limitations on liberalisation of the energy sector. Although 
Estonia’s radical free market system opened the country to the forces of 
liberalisation and privatisation, energy did not take the same effect primarily 
because of the infrastructures of oil shale development and perceptions of 
Russian threat at the time. After the Cold War, Estonia was part of the Baltic 
‘energy islands,’ a geographic and political term coined to describe the limited 
ability of the Baltics to import electricity and gas from other countries except 
Russia. The Energy Act in 1997 brought up issues of privatisation, but the 
initiatives were cancelled due to the popular belief of state involvement in the 
sector.  
 
In contrast to Estonia’s energy sector, the production sector of Polish electricity, 
and to some extent in transmission, experienced gradual liberalisation. Like their 
own telecommunications sector, the Polish energy sector was transferred to the 
hands of domestic oligopolies with international partners in some levels of the 
vertical and horizontal integrated network. The Polish government endeavoured 
to eliminate non-profitable mines through the optimal use of coal, the withdrawal 
of government subsidy, and reduction of guaranteed employment. With high 
levels inefficiencies costing huge amounts of money, the government launched 
the five-year Hard Coal Sector Program, which reduced employment by 50%. The 
interconnections of the Polish infrastructural network to neighbouring countries 
encouraged foreign participation. The Polish government wanted to attract 
capital to modernise coal plants, promote environmental protection, and shake 
off the inefficiency in the sector. Several examples attest to this. The French 
monopoly ‘Electricity de France invested in the 450-megawatt coal-fired plant in 
Krakow’ (EIA 1996: 46), while Spanish Edesa has some shares in the Tauron and 
PGE. In 2004, Poland received a loan from the World Bank worth $160 million to 
convert coal plants into productive ventures.  
The production commodity chain of coal and oil shale made privatisation viable. 
With the technological developments across the world, coal could be profitable in 
highly decentralised structures (PPM 2012). Put simply, there are a variety of coal 
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uses: steam coal for electricity production; ‘coking coal for steel production’ 
(World Coal Association 2012); ‘and ammonia gas to produce ammonia salts, 
‘nitric acid, and agricultural fertilisers’ (World Coal Association 2012). Other 
products include ‘alumina refineries; paper manufacturers; chemical and 
pharmaceutical industries’ (World Coal Association 2012); chemical products 
from coal and coal tar could be used to create ‘creosote oil; naphthalene; phenol; 
and benzene’ (World Coal Association 2012). At this point, coal-mining facilities 
were privatised and turned into chemical production plants, methane, and other 
productive export ventures. The most important example is a company called the 
JSW group, which comprised of Jastrzębska Spółka Węglowa S.A. Group [JSWA] 
and Koksownia Przyjaźń (PPM 2012). The former is stated-owned, which is open 
to private investment, while foreign and domestic shareholders own the latter. 
Many other designated smaller non-profitable mines were transformed to the 
chemical and other export-oriented sectors.  
Thus, the liberalisation of the energy sector and conversion to marketable 
ventures were much more limited in Estonia. One of the main motivations for 
investing in private companies in Poland were not only higher demand for coal 
and energy, but also the convertibility of coal into other products for profit (Bell, 
Towler & Maohong 2010; Mill 2004). Although American companies tried to tap 
the Estonian market, the concentration of expertise and technological 
development in Estonia, as well as the development of c made conditions for 
liberalisation much less viable than in Poland. While oil shale could be converted 
to shale oil for household heating, Eesti Energia holds the exclusive expertise in 
that product. Since Estonia leads the oil shale development, its pace was much 
slower and contained; its direction was directed at securing energy 
independence. However, despite these, the majority and most dominant coal 
companies are still under the hands of the oligopolistic state and private 
companies 
In a similar conclusion, liberalisation was much more viable and profitable to 
state goals in Polish energy than telecommunications. The coal system consists of 
smaller units of convertible industries, and since modernisation and 
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environmental issues were tied to the industry, losing some of the smaller coal 
and unproductive facilities was profitable for the incumbents; however, this was 
not the case in telecommunication since the more that oligopolistic companies 
control the communication infrastructures, the more competitive they become 
(Bruce, Kessides, and Kneifel 1999). The already existing smaller industries could 
be converted to oligopolies to compete in the EU and global market; in contrasts, 
the inadequate nature of infrastructures in telecommunications limited the 
impact of liberalisation in sector. In essence, what allowed partial liberalisation of 
Polish energy were the again the technological and characteristics, consistent 
with state size and the type of capitalism. 
 
For regulatory design, both countries used a broader regulatory institution in 
competition matters and sector-specific institutions for energy and 
telecommunications. Estonia, then, does not conform to the expectation that 
smaller states would use broader regulatory institutions in sector regulation: in 
Poland’s case, the Polish UOKiK for competition, and the URT and URE for 
sector regulation; while for Estonia, the ECB for competition, and the ENCB, 
EMI, and ESA for sector regulation. The consolidation of a single regulatory 
regime on both sectors in Poland could be explained by the sheer size of the 
country—particularly, the need for infrastructure in telecommunications, and 
link of coal to the country’s industrialisation in energy (PPM 2012; Skoczyny 
2011). 
 
In terms of regulatory effectiveness, these policies were implemented much 
easier in the Estonian telecommunications, but the opposite happened in energy. 
Although no one could contest the decision made by the Estonian Competition 
Board to conform to the insulation of a independent regulatory model−a source 
of tension in the design roots back to the appointment of the competition 
authority by the Minister of Economic Affairs and Communication (Reinaste; 
Vaks 2012). In energy, this same minister is simultaneously the sole shareholder 
of Estonia’s dominant State Owned Company, Eesti Energia (Kisel; Vaks 2012). 
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Thus, a situation of ‘double hatted’ occurred in Estonia. As Einari Kisel said, the 
single shareholder role of the Minister of Economic Affairs and Communication 
in Eesti Energia roots back to the Soviet period. This, he said, was not touched at 
all during the EU negotiations to protect the sector at the worst situations. In 
regulatory disputes, the role of the judiciary or the Estonian Supreme Court, was 
institutionalised and still very salient up until today (Kisel; Reinaste 2012). In 
telecommunications, while the appointment system was also the same, the issues 
were not as tenuous and hotly debated in Estonian high court. The relative 
absence of regulatory issues in telecommunications could be explained by the 
supportive state in Estonia’s radical neoliberal model. With the sheer importance 
of enticing capital in the sector and across all other sectors in the economy, the 
Estonian government had to ensure its effectiveness in regulatory matters. 
 
For both sectors in Poland, the type of capitalism, the embedded capitalism 
model created regulatory problems in both sectors. Although the Polish 
government wanted to ensure the protection of workers and the gradual 
adjustment of consumers from the price shocks, regulatory policies because of 
majority ownership of telecommunications and energy was still in the hands of 
the Ministry of Treasury. Using the justification of protecting the people from 
economic shocks and inflation, the incumbents and the regulatory institutions 
delayed the entrants of new competitors and limited competition in both sectors. 
The lack of independent of the Polish URT and the authoritarian tendencies of 
the URE were keen examples. In 2001, Poland still had some of the lowest rates 
of telecommunications infrastructure and long-distance access in the CEE. While 
further competition might have benefited Poland, such an implication was not 
easily seen due to the need to cushion the incumbent telecommunication 
oligopolies. Similar to Estonia, the double-hatted issue took place in both sectors; 
the Ministry of Economy had the power to appoint the head of the URE and URT, 
and the Ministry of Treasury were the major owners of the state stakes in both 
companies (Stefanowicz & Dmyterko 2011).  
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To what extent does the accession process matter in pushing for policy 
transformation? In Estonia, the Telecommunications Act of 2001 opened the 
sector to full competition and dissolved the exclusive rights of the majority state-
owned company, Eesti Telekom. The EU Directive of 2002 that deals with pricing 
access, information dissemination, and regulatory procedures was thoroughly 
implemented. In Poland, the Telecommunications Law of 2000 was also passed 
to open competition to some extent, but the actual implementation only started 
in 2003−two years after Estonia, Poland, and the Czech republic implemented 
similar laws. Poland had a problem in following the 2002/21/EC (Stefanowicz & 
Dmyterko 2011), or the Common Regulatory Framework for Electronic 
Communications Networks and Services, also known as the EU directive of 2002. 
Poland passed the law in 2004 to comply with the requirements but there were 
multiple implementation problems, which resulted in the EU Commission taking 
Poland to the ECJ at least 4 times for infringement procedures (Stefanowicz & 
Dmyterko 2011). The formation of large oligopolies or as some would call neo-
mercantilism before the accession process shows the limit of the EU’s power from 
membership. Although neo-mercantilism existed and persisted in the 
telecommunication sectors of both states, Estonia managed to implement 
effective regulation and full competition even earlier than the EU mandate and 
better than some old member states; the contrasts in the delays in long-distance 
competition and the difficulties of acquiring licenses for new entrants in Polish 
telecommunications.  
 
In energy, the first and second packages were adapted in both states to promote 
liberalisation and competition. Though the first package lacked the backing of EU 
institutions apart from the Commission, the second package facilitated the 
informal regulatory exchange and learning amongst energy regulators in the EU. 
Energy regulators from both states also participated in Florence Initiative and the 
Madrid protocol, even before official EU membership (Kisel 2012). Although neo-
mercantilism was present, the partial liberalisation of Polish energy in part due to 
the technological capacities of coal and mining show the opportunities given to 
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the chemical and coke industries from both globalisation and Europeanisation 
(Jarno, & Warzecha 2011). The accompanying formation of oligopolies in Poland 
through partial privatisation was responding to liberalisation and modernisation 
trends. While the independence of energy regulators in both states were both 
questionable, majority state-ownership of energy seems a dominant model in 
most of the EU; however, the regulatory conflicts could be explained by state 
size−the role of the Estonian Supreme Court for smaller states and the regulatory 
problems of bigger states per se.   
 
In sum, the EU regulatory regimes in both sectors should have pushed for the 
similar levels of transformation of governance, decreasing levels of neo-
mercantilism, and strategies of internationalisation corresponding to the 
opportunities at the EU level. Indeed Estonia and Poland moved towards some 
these transformations, but Europeanisation neither accounts for the reasons for 
shifting for these transformations nor the forms taken after. Linking pre-
accession to the argument, the successful transformation of Estonia’s 
telecommunications in governance and markets, and Poland’s partial 
transformation in energy markets, could be explained by their desire to harness 
the benefits of globalisation by structuring its economy around the effective 
infusion of capital. While state size and the type of capitalism explains the 
persistence of regulatory problems and partial liberalisation for Polish 
telecommunications, the same could be said for the state’s monopoly of energy in 
Estonia.  
 
3.1.4 EU Regulatory Regime in Energy and Telecommunications after 2004 
 
There are two big shifts in the EU Regulatory Regime for both sectors after 2004. 
In the telecommunications regime November 2009, after two years of debate, the 
EU parliament and the Council of Ministers agreed to reform the EU Telecoms 
Regime. There were two new provisions under the 2009 directive, the Better 
Regulation Directive, which gives independent telecommunications regulation 
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more power, and the Citizens’ Rights Directive, which broadly protects privacy 
rights, were to be transposed in the national laws and subsequently implemented. 
The five previous existing EU Telecommunication directives were to be amended.  
 
In the realm of energy, a mandatory third energy package took off, aiming to 
mandatory unbundle—separate the production, transmission, and distribution 
aspects—the energy sector. This landmark summit in December 2008, after a 
year of debating in the EU Parliament, the EU decided on an ambitious project to 
downsize its emissions, expand the share of renewable energy and increase 
energy efficiency by 20%. To do this, the EU Commission was given powers to 
mandatory unbundle—separate energy distribution from energy production to 
promote competition and promote consumer interests. On the political side, 
climate and energy issues were officially declared to be interconnected and 
interrelated issues, which cannot be dealt with separately and impossible to 
dichotomise. Since Fukushima, the appeal of nuclear energy diminished in 
Germany, one of the biggest EU countries; and the demand for natural gas from 
Russia, amongst other possible places, has been projected to increase.  
 
3.1.5 Telecommunications Regime in Estonia and Poland after 2004 
 
After 2004, Estonia was the first country to completely liberalise its 
telecommunication sector. In terms of funding and support, the Estonia made the 
whole and complete use of EU resource—expertise, technical assistance, 
institutional building capacity, and financial base. Estonia’s open and liberal 
economy resulted in an excellent market hub, transportation, and an ideal 
location for production and distribution (Harkmaa 2010). A huge chunk of 
‘rapidly growing transit trade’ goes ‘through the Baltic Sea’; for instance, ‘the 
deep-water port’ and the ‘free zone of Muuga harbour are very good examples for 
the Baltic and CIS markets’ (Estonia EU 2012). Thus, competition is fully open in 
Estonia’s telecommunication and many non-state companies are administering 
the service. In terms of telecommunications, there are four big providers of fixed-
in lines and mobile telephone service. However, this must not be seen as an issue 
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of oligopoly, rather population and state size, make the optimum number of 
major companies to 4. Internet, DSL, Mobile-lines, and other services are fully 
open and are currently very competitive (Harkmaa 2010).  
 
The main goal of Estonia’s telecommunication sector is to enhance, ensure, and 
develop competition, as well as openness in the sector. Telecommunication 
development was pushed by foreign investors—mostly Nordic—who had huge 
amounts of investments in high technological, communication networks, and 
integrated networks to develop the IT communications infrastructure in Estonia. 
Many analysts in the international scene consider Estonia to be the centre of 
broadband DSL Connection in Central and Eastern Europe—in fact, for DSL 
penetration per telephone line, Estonia ranks amongst the top ten in the world. 
Other than Internet coverage, there are over 1,100 free access points around the 
country. Most recently, the advancement in telecommunications technology, 
market prices, and convenience made many consumers switch from fixed phone 
lines to mobile phones. In terms of digital phone connection, the whole of Estonia 
is covered, while there are 117 contrasts per 100 (Harkmaa 2010). 
 
Liberalisation in Poland continued at a moderate pace after accession, still 
maintaining oligopolistic competition amongst several big companies. From 
2004 to 2010, the state still owned majority shares in TPSA along with several 
important foreign shareholders. The incumbent serves 8.9 million fixed-line 
subscribers along with ‘2.4 broadband subscribers and 14.2 million mobile users’ 
(Microsoft Lynch 2010). Competition seems to be very vibrant in other services 
such as cable TV, DSL, and mobile networks (Olszynka 2010; PAIZ 2006), but 
competition in fixed lines are still limited. Come 2007, the biggest shifts in Polish 
economic liberalisation came because of the increasing state deficits and the 
financial crisis in 2008. Although there were plans by the Ministry of Treasury to 
privatise some of the state-assets, the acceleration of privatisation came when the 
Polish government refused to increase taxes and decided instead to slash 
government spending in many of the state-owned enterprises, including Polish 
telecommunications. In 2011, the biggest mobile service provided, Polkomtel, 
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which was shared amongst TPSA and the other three big companies, was bought 
out by Solorz-Zak, the owner of telecommunication competitors Cyfrowy Polsat 
and Aero2. While TPSA has been selling its subsidiaries such as EMITEL 
(Stefanowicz & Dmyterko 2011), the role of foreign shareholders French Telecom 
in incumbent company also increased to 49.47%. TPSA is now looking to expand 
its operations internationally by using the name of the Orange, the popular 
French telecom group. However, in local fixed-lines telephones, TPSA position is 
currently being threatened by NETIA, a new competitor. 
Regulation in Estonian telecommunications followed EU directives quite 
effectively. Estonia had to incorporate the 2002 EU directives for harmonisation. 
Estonia’s accession to the EU on 1 May 2004 and the implementation of the 
Electronic Communications Act on 1 January 2005 led to even greater 
harmonisation. The Electronic Communications Act’s effects started on 1 January 
2005, which regulated all the operations of the electronic communications 
networks. Regulation takes place via the minister of Economic Affairs and 
Communications, the Estonian Technical Surveillance Authority [ETSA], and the 
Estonian Competition Authority [ECA] (Harkmaa 2010). The ECA provided full 
transparency to the public regarding the availability of electronic 
communications networks, communication services, radio communications, the 
administrative structure of frequencies, numbering, apparatus, and state 
supervision over the compliance of full requirements and punishment for any 
form of violation (Harkmaa 2010). The Estonian Technical Surveillance 
Authority provides the central coordination and regulation for all other state 
bodies. Eventually by 2007, the ETSA was put under the Estonian Competition 
Authority, allowing a single body to preside over regulatory issues and functions 
in all policy sectors. 
 
After accession, the initial role of the telecommunications regulator in Poland 
became a mediator rather than a stern and acting body to over competition. 
While this position belies that regulation is a contract concluded between service 
providers and the consumer, and the regulator administers the agreement. The 
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dominant trend in Poland’s telecommunication seems to be self-regulation of the 
companies (DGC 2012; Olszynka 2011; PAIZ 2006), which pertains to the 
steering and rowing activities conducted by the regulated actors themselves. 
However, scrutiny from the EU Commission brought Poland to the URT for 
changes in Polish regulatory matters. Specifically, the Commission filed a case 
against Poland regarding the unlimited capacity of the Prime Minister to remove 
the head of the URT (Stefanowicz & Dmyterko 2011). Since the state still remains 
to the major competitor in the sector, the EU Commission and the DG of 
Competition Argued that this violated regulatory competences (DGC 2012). In 
response, then, Poland amended the telecommunications law in 2009 to comply 
with independent telecommunications regulation. Similarly, changes in the 
regulatory could be seen. In 2006, the UOKiK filed a huge case against TPSA 
regarding obscuring competition matters in broadband connections, while the 
URT continues to guide privatisation and regulatory matters in the sector.  
 
3.1.6 Energy Regime in Estonia and Poland after 2004 
 
In privatisation, it appears that both states faced different kinds of pressure. In 
Estonia, state-owned Eesti Energia was almost put in London’s Initial Public 
Offering. Such a decision was made by the board of directors of Eesti Energia, 
who thought that there was a need for private capital to increase the efficiency of 
the company and allow infrastructure restructuring (Lewandoski 2011). The 
decision of the company was reversed by the state, through the Minister of 
Economic Affairs and Communication. Estonian’s plan could be seen in two 
pertinent documents. Estonia’s 2008-2015 Plan for Oil Shale development, and 
the Development Plan for the Estonian Electricity sector, affirm the desire of the 
state to remain strong in the sector (Ministry of Economic Affairs and 
Communication 2008). The state still remains to be the dominant player in the 
energy sector. While Eesti Energia remains to the majority providers of 
electricity, the state owns most of the transmission lines through the 
management of operation companies such as the OÜ Elering, which was moved 
under direct state control in 2010 (URE 2011). While there are 40 smaller 
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distributional companies as a whole, the state-owned OÜ Jaotusvõrk controls 
87% of the lines (URE 2011).  
 
At this time, the derogation granted by the European Union has taken effect. In 
2009 the Estonian government opened 35% of the market to competition. 
Competition was also galvanised through the third package. In particular, laws 
that are directly and indirectly related to the transformation of markets and 
governance of renewable energy shares. The concern for security in Estonia 
pushed for a complicated state framework, which is strategically aimed at 
reducing gas exports for Russia (Kisel; Reinaste 2012). Through the form of the 
renewable energy subsidy and cooperation with various renewable energy 
companies, renewable energy–specifically, biomass due to the weather–is rising 
heavily in Estonia, most especially since 2007. While the share of renewables was 
5% in 2007, it pushed to 11% in 2012, in which most were heavily concentrated in 
the gas dependent regions. Thus, competition is being redirected towards gas 
dependent regions in Russia through the support of strategic renewable energy 
sectors. 
 
The developments Poland is slightly different. Due to the financial deficits 
experienced by the state, power producing companies are now being restructured 
and sold to Chinese and Japanese companies, and several major deals have been 
reported to take place soon. In 2007, the Ministry of Treasury transferred most of 
the shares in the smaller energy companies and Enea to Tauron, which became 
one of the largest companies in Poland. Other state-controlled energy companies 
such as Enea, Energa, and Tauron were floated in the Warsaw stock exchange in 
2010. The state called for a majority bid on these companies, as well as the 
willingness to sell 10% of shares in PGE. Due to the available infrastructural 
links, most of the interested buyers came from Germany’s RWE and Sweden’s 
Vattellan. In recent months, there was a failure to privatise due to issues of price 
negotiations. Poland tried to merge Energa into PGE, but failed on both the EU 
Competition DG and the UOKiK. For competition matters related to the third 
package, characteristics of a ‘big state,’ and the geography make Poland 
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conducive for renewable energy investments—particularly, in the wind sector 
industry. Renewable energy in 2010 was 9.1% and investments from renewable 
energy have been helpful to the Polish economy (PPM; Skoczyny; Lewandoski 
2011).  
 
In energy regulation in Estonia after membership, the negotiations over the third 
liberalisation package remained vibrant (Kisel; Reinaste; Vaks 2012). Pertinent to 
regulatory matters, and similar to all other sectors in Estonia, all regulatory 
institutions were transformed into the ECA in 2007. Similarly, ‘double-hatted’ 
issue of the Minister of Economic Affairs of Communication—having both roles 
of being the person in charge of appointing leaders of the ECA and the main 
shareholder of Eesti Energia—was resolved through limiting the power of 
minister in certain decisions (Kisel; Reinaste; Vaks 2012). Pricing matters are set 
by the ECA, but the formula in calculating the appropriate electricity price was 
partially taken from the EU’s definition of fairness. In terms the Estonian 
Supreme Court, energy regulation remains strong in those cases.   
 
In Poland, power still resided in the hands of the president of the URE. Although 
there were promises to allow greater leverage for price negotiations, the URE 
president remained firm on his stand regarding these companies (Skoczyny 
2011). Due to the need to preserve predictability in the economy, newer 
competences and autonomy were given to the URE. The institution, however, 
does not hold exclusive regulation in the sector since the UOKiK remains a 
vibrant regulator in mergers and competition matters (PTO 2012).  
 
3.1.7 Summation and Comparison across Sectors and Nations after 2004 
 
In terms of telecommunication, both states are liberalised and to their own 
extents conform to the demands of the EU. As discussed in the pre-2004 
component, Estonia came in first, owing to the historical development of 
telecommunications, and size, Poland followed right after due to the need of the 
state for capital. Estonia’s telecommunications continue to remain liberalise and 
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open to competition, while similar trends are going on in Poland−Polkomtel was 
transferred into private hands; TPSA is facing competition in fixed-lines 
telephony; and French Telecom is increasing its role in TPSA. Sector specific 
characteristics, such as the internationalisation and diffusion of the Internet 
access, the demand for mobile telephones, and the greater demand for capital 
were the intervening links to capital and other businesses. Thus, liberalisation 
and competition were pushed by the need for the efficient functioning of the 
economy. 
 
In energy, while Estonia is largely neoliberal in many respects, concerns for 
energy security and geopolitical issues with Russia make the sector a target for 
state control (Kisel; Vaks 2012). Another reason is that technological 
characteristics of the sector inhibit smaller scales of privatisation and partial 
ownership to take place. As Einari Kisel−the former deputy secretary general of 
the energy department in Estonia−said, if Eesti Energia desires to profit, then it 
would push to investing in the infrastructure, marketing, and distribution of 
shale oil—particularly, for heating and other uses (Kisel 2012). However, because 
of concerns for energy security, technological and financial investments are 
directed towards improving the efficiency of oil shale electricity production.  
 
The financial crisis in 2009 pushed Poland to eventually create more 
privatisation policies across the board (DGC 2012; Olszynka 2011); specifically, 
the unsustainable state spending that were still kept in place since the post-
communist period significantly affect impacts growth of the country (PPM 2012). 
Although majority of the major energy companies still remains in the hands of 
the state, several investors are coming and privatising former national stakes 
(Ratyńska 2012). As such, although Poland was an ‘embedded neoliberal’ country 
that chose to gradually move away from state planning, the direction of the 
country towards neoliberalism pushed the financial burden to the government. 
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Estonian telecommunications seem to remain efficient following their type of 
capitalism. In Poland, the role of the EU has been most salient since the 
Commission has launched several ECJ cases. However, even though there was a 
repeal of the telecommunications act in 2009, the URT remains a weak body in 
regulatory disputes. Instead, through the support of the EU, the UOKiK deals 
with regulatory and competition matters as well.  
 
In energy, regulatory measures seem to follow and conform to the ‘general 
regulatory’ model even after accession. The smaller regulatory institutions were 
merged into a central ECB. Furthermore, the ‘legal’ unbundling of the Minister of 
Communication and Economy as the sole share holder of Estonia’s incumbent 
energy company, and the person tasked to appoint the competition authority, has 
been dealt with in 2007. Poland’s URE is task to regulate tariffs and prices, and 
the institution seems to be conforming to the EU model (Ratyńska 2012). 
Similarly, the UOKiK shares a role in dealing with competition matters.  
 
Privatisation’s results, in contrast, have been quite different. Estonia’s failed 
privatisation in 2009 pushed the country to greater state control. In 2011, Estonia 
requested EU cohesion funds to fund the newly planned oil shale infrastructures, 
but was block by the EU Commission and taken to the ECJ. The ECJ, then, ruled 
that Estonia’s plans threaten competition, prompting a reversal of oil shale 
restructuring funds. The refusal to privatise by limiting competition on non-
production energy areas continues in Estonia. Poland’s privatisation continues, 
seeming to be directly linked related to financial deficits of needing capital due to 
the state subsidy of sectors and ‘welfare’ (PPM 2012). Furthermore, the interest 
on Poland’s energy sector seems strong because of the carbon credits allowance 
allocated (PPM 2012). The Polish government, knowing this particularly well, 
intends to capitalise to draw in more investments. In this regard, technological-
specific characteristics of sectors do not conform at all.  
 
To what extent does the EU matter? First, the movement towards Poland’s 
privatisation in both telecommunications and energy could be traced back to the 
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general financial issues of the state and the need to attract investments and 
capital. The gradual reform of institutions and the necessity to cushion transition 
were some of the factors that led to the general dilemma. Second, the EU’s impact 
on both the markets of both states seem to be limited since the main movers of 
telecommunications and energy were sector-specific characteristics and greater 
globalising landscape. Similarly, the EU’s impact through membership seems to 
be null; liberalisation of telecommunications in both states continues, as part of 
the broader economic agenda and Estonia’s refusal to privatise in energy but 
allow for partial competition in renewable energy are outcomes from security 
related factors. However, in terms of regulation on both sectors, the EU’s impact 
seem to be consistent and strong—the legal unbundling in Estonia and the 
continuing independence of the URE. The sector-specific regulators in Poland 
seemed to be limited, but the competition board has taken a greater role. 
 
In sum, the post-accession EU regulatory regimes in both sectors were relative 
effective in governance, but not for the transformation of markets. Neo- 
mercantilism in Polish telecommunications and energy appears to continue, in 
particular the continue development of oligopolies, but competition appears to be 
increasing. In Estonia, the state appears to be stable in its role as the dominant 
actor. As a whole, transformations in the markets of Polish telecommunications 
and energy were pushed by Poland’s desire to make the most of the changing 
global conditions. In Estonia, transformations in the energy markets were 
extremely small and were taken because of the need to reduce Russian gas. The 
intervening factor of state size continues to affect decisions on internalising 
globalisation. Although there is a market on shale oil, through its creation from 
oil shale, these cannot be considered as a priority due to existing perception of 
Russian threat.  
 
3.2 Summary  
 
Through the process tracing of markets and governance in both, the chapter 
argued that the link of transformations and the EU is weak. Rather, policy 
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transformation is explained by the state’s desire to internalise and harness 
globalisation, structured by the type of capitalism and state size. Furthermore, 
the EU’s link to the transformation of markets appears weak in contrast to 
governance. Such outcomes could be explained by the relative success of indirect 
regulatory learning and the clearer link of markets to global factors. Since the link 
between the EU and market changes was weak, the impact of membership 
appears to be weak. This is also proven by the effectiveness of the EU’s impact on 
governance after membership; an empirical proof contrary to the popular notion 
of the EU’s effectiveness before accession.  
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CHAPTER 4 
 
THE POLITICS OF UNCONVENTIONAL ENERGY IN 
ESTONIA AND POLAND 
 
4. Introduction 
 
In this chapter, I argue that resources modify the state’s expectations and 
management of globalisation by opening political and economic spaces. By 
involving more actors in the process, unconventional energy indirectly influences 
the policy transformation of energy. Following the resource geography 
perspective, for Estonia and Poland, this may come as an opportunity to expand 
their influence in the EU and on the international scale. Without declaring 
finality on this on-going issue, but rather presenting a starting piece of research 
for others, this chapter demonstrates that Estonia and Poland are taking 
advantage of open markets and international opportunities. This chapter also 
shows that the utilisation of unconventional energy does not bode well with some 
institutions inside the EU. It shows that the very globalisation that the EU helped 
promote after the Cold War is now something that hinders the EU’s other goals.  
 
Several trends could be seen. First, there is a trend of internationalising shale 
energy in both states, which comes in the form of inviting and helping countries 
to participate, cooperate, or invest. Internationalisation could also be any of the 
following: the measures to internationalise unconventional energy through the 
export of technology, the initiative to foster network connections outside EU 
actors, and the desire to acquire support for the technological regime. This could 
be because of the intent on bolstering their political positions within the EU. 
Second, there seems to be a trend in both states, through the use of 
unconventional energy, to further their political, environmental, and climate 
credentials. Oddly enough, such trend comes from the fear that the EU or the 
dominant member states might ban or place a moratorium on their energy 
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systems. Thus, while there is the Europe 2020 as a platform for renewable energy 
and emissions reduction, Estonia and Poland are keen on proving their 
environmental credentials.  
 
4.1.1 Estonian Oil Shale 
  
Oil shale, put simply, is a fine-grained sedimentary rock that could be processed 
or converted to produce oil. However, the main difference with fossil fuels is that 
the economic cost of extraction, processing, and environmental externalities after 
are much higher. In the networks working in energy, there is no consensus to 
what ‘oil shale’ is, particularly because humanity’s notion of resources evolves 
overtime. Put simply, resources are not born, but become.  
 
In Estonia, the government started to develop long-term contracts and ‘oil-shale’ 
relationships with Jordan and the United States. This act, primarily taken by the 
Estonian government and Eesti Energia, is a strategy to take advantage of 
Estonia’s 3rd generation Oil Shale Technology. According to former head of the 
Energy Department, Einari Kisel, the current oil shale technology that Estonia 
currently possesses comprises of 3rd generation technology; the two other states, 
which trail behind Estonia’s technology, are Brazil and China (Kisel 2012). 
However, while Brazil and China use oil shale to generate electricity as the 3rd or 
4th best method, as well as to create shale oil, the current level of technology, in 
terms of efficiency and environmental externalities, belongs to the 1st 
generation—which as Kisel said, Estonia had during the 1930s (Kisel; Reinaste 
2012). Therefore, in terms of the large-scale utilisation of electricity that could be 
achieved and subsidised presently, Estonia is the only state in the world that has 
this capacity. There are other non-state entities, primarily transnational 
companies like Shell and Chevron, which continue to develop oil-shale 
technology, but their expertise lie at diminishing the environmental cost of oil 
shale extraction. 
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Given this background, what are the efforts of Estonia’s developing 
internationalisation of oil shale? At the moment, there are several important 
projects. First, and most importantly, the key role of Estonia as the leading and 
only oil-shale country in the world, in developing the initial process of extraction 
and training to various states in the world, has been recognised by many within 
the state and by an increasing number of countries around the world. Specifically, 
Estonia signed an agreement with Jordan to harvest the El Lajjun site, while 
many other non-oil rich North African and Middle East countries are acting on or 
considering oil shale development. Just a few weeks ago, Serbia and Estonia 
concluded an agreement to develop both newly found and old reserves at 
Aleksinac. Thus, the recognition of Estonia, as the key actor in this sector, goes 
beyond North Africa to other states, who see the possibility of oil shale 
development as a viable alternative to the increasing security risks with gas and 
the fluctuating oil market in the future (Kisel; Vaiks 2012).  
 
Second, Estonia has been able to use its exclusive knowledge to further its 
position in the European Union. The Southern Mediterranean partnership, also 
known as the European-Mediterranean Union, a political project launched by the 
French and Italian governments to control migration from North Africa, was an 
important project for the ‘southern’ part of the EU (Kisel; Vaiks 2012). These 
other EU leaders recognised the need for development in North Africa, partially 
for an end in itself, but also to hinder the flow of migrants to North Africa. Given 
these, the EU Commission, alongside the other leaders of the member states, 
sought Estonia’s help in 2006 and 2007 to assist North African states in oil shale 
development. Estonia gladly acquiesced, particularly the leading state actor in the 
third pillar of the Mediterranean Union. From another perspective, Estonia’s new 
rule could be seen as an acquisition of capacity to promote its ‘place’ in the EU 
(EEM; Reinaste 2012). Literature has explained the idea that some countries 
move towards promoting democracy and development; this could be especially 
seen in the Caucuses with the number of development scholarships that Estonia 
awards Georgia.   
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Aside from helping other states develop their oil shale fields, Estonia has also 
been planning for ‘uncertainty’ through the acquisition of oil shale lands; the 
technology from transnational companies; and the expansion of the 
consciousness regarding oil shale through the promotion of a community of 
experts. The recent purchase of land in the United States—particularly in 
Wyoming, Utah, and Colorado—is an example of this. Interestingly enough, the 
backlash for Eesti Energia’s expansion did not happen in the European Union, 
but in the older environmental movements in the United States, such as the 
Habitat for Humanity, the Green Peace, and the World Wildlife Foundation 
(Reinaste 2012). In terms of technology development, Eesti Energia has been 
developing ties with some of the biggest publicly-traded energy companies--Shell, 
Chevron, and Exxon Mobil--in developing more efficient extraction and 
conversion technology, as well as safer and less costly approaches to disposing 
waste (Reinaste; Kisel 2012). 
 
These developments, however, do not bode fully well with some entities in the 
European Union (DGEN 2012). Ever since accession, there has always been 
opposition to oil shale usage: particularly, the Directorate-General of Climate; the 
Directorate-General of Environment; and the Renewable Energy Companies. 
Several examples could illuminate these disagreements. During the negotiations 
for EU membership, although Estonia was eventually given the right to derogate 
from privatisation, competition, and emissions reduction, this was a very 
contentious process involving the clash of several EU DGs. As Jako said, Estonia 
had to explain to the DG of Climate and Environment about its complicated and 
unique energy system (Kisel 2012); although, allies could be found in the DG of 
Energy and Industry (Vaiks 2012).  
 
However, in recent events, the clash inside the EU has been taking place due to 
the increasing demand of climate reductions, the third energy liberalisation 
package, and the growing saliency of energy issues around the world. The 
Commission of DG Climate, backed by various renewable energy companies, 
proposed to ban the development and the utilisation of ‘dirty oil’--in this case, oil 
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shale and Tar Sands--which was met by heavy protest by Canada in the World 
Trade Organisation. Another example comes in the attempt of Estonia to build 
new oil shale processing and utilisation plants just a year ago, which was blocked 
by the EU Commission due to Estonia’s intention to use cohesion funds (Reineste 
2012). The EU Commission, along with the support of several DGs and renewable 
energy companies, blocked Estonia’s plans, citing the violation of competition 
laws within the EU. The ECJ backed the Commission’s decision and had Estonia 
retract its plans.  
 
One of the most important facts of oil shale development is the evolution of its 
security complex. Most notably, the oil shale complex has different dimensions of 
national security. Just like any other state, public utilities are considered to be 
extremely important because they act as central nodes in the state’s functioning 
and existence. In the case of Estonia, more than just an energy system, the oil 
shale complex has extra security dimensions directly linked to Estonia’s leading 
role in oil shale development. There have been several cases documented of 
attempted espionage by the Chinese, as well as by Russians and ‘unknown’ 
mercenaries (EPM 2012). As such, numerous defence mechanisms have been 
established, which include radius limits for civilians venturing near to or around 
the oil shale facilities.  
 
4.1.2 Polish Shale Gas 
 
Shale gas is natural gas trapped in shale formations. To extract gas from shale, 
there is a need to fluidise the formations because of the insufficient permeability 
to allow fluid flow to be captured. With 17,7 TCM (624 Tcf) of technically 
recoverable shale gas resources in Europe, the internationalisation of shale gas, at 
the moment, is vastly more conflictual than oil shale. This is primarily because of 
its capacity to foster a geopolitical earthquake in Europe or transform Europe’s 
energy situation, which could potentially shift depending on shale gas’ viability. 
There are numerous examples attesting to the controversy regarding the energy 
source. Most prominently, the French parliament imposed a moratorium on 
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hydraulic fracturing, the artificial inducement of fractures on pressurised liquid, 
on June 2011; this was used as a means of moving gas underground, as well as 
other shale gas processes. Companies who had fracturing licenses and potential 
shale gas sites had to use a different method, otherwise they would have to face 
sanctions or sequestration of their claims (Shaw; Watt 2012). On the EU level, 
shale gas extraction is forbidden and regulations around it are not yet clear 
(Shaw; Watt 2012). At most, the EU initiated a large international project called 
‘GASH’ in order to map potential shale prospects in Europe (Tomescu 2011). 
However, the lack of proper regulations in the EU and the level of discretion 
given to member states render such a policy at the EU level useless (Rappold 
2011). For instance, on the DG level, the current shale gas operations hover in 
legal ambiguity. Any intervention from the DG of Environment, then, either 
needs to fall in institutionalised environmental laws, or via the DG of 
Competition in the murky politics of competition (DGEN 2012). In spite of these, 
holding the largest resources amongst all the EU countries, Poland has been 
developing shale gas in many of its regions. An estimated total of recoverable 
resources at 5/3 Tcm (187), or 30% of Europe’s total reserves and 74% of Central 
Europe’s Share. Apart from Poland, there were significant sources located in 
France, Norway, Ukraine, Sweden, Denmark, and the United Kingdom (Wierslaw 
2011). There are lot of reserves in CEE, particularly in Bulgaria, Romania, and the 
Czech Republic (DGEN 2012).  
 
At the moment, internationalisation could be found in Poland’s shale gas; 
numerous transnational companies are participating in shale gas exploration 
through the use of the latest technologies imported from the US (Jezierski 2011). 
Some of the biggest energy companies in the World – Shell, Exxon Mobil, Total – 
are investing massive amounts in exploration, institutional support, and in 
establishing links with the Polish government (Ridley 2011; WEC 2010). The 
support of the United States cannot be understated, as American officials and the 
American ambassador to Poland attends shale gas events and summits. 
Moreover, the US invited Poland and all the other Central and East European 
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countries to the United States to witness the safety and effectiveness of shale gas 
extraction (Reinaste; Shaw 2012).  
 
Particularly interesting in the shale gas presentations is the desire of Polish 
officials and transnational companies to promote their environmental and 
climate credentials. Transnational companies, particularly from the US, brought 
the newest and supposedly safest technology, which include coal bed methane 
and shale gas fuel; fluidised bed gasiers del; nitrogen oxide burners; and systems 
to control emissions (Shaoul 2011). As Polish officials and transnational 
companies argue, the use of shale gas would result in solving the demands of the 
EU 2020 (DGEN; Shaw; Watt 2012). The carbon emissions of shale gas are very, 
very low in contrast to several other energy resources, solving not only the supply 
of security and environmental issues, but also pushing the EU’s climate 
credentials in the international arena. Such arguments, however, need to pass the 
EU’s environmental assessment (Rappold 2011). Although shale gas is still under 
consideration in the EU level, and highly politicised in some countries, it would 
still pass the judgment of the DGs and the EU Commission per se (Blough 2011).  
However, doing so might not be enough to legitimise the energy system, as 
politicisation in the EU high-level meetings might result in the decoupling of the 
energy system. At the moment, there are five issues that the EU wants shale gas 
to solve: (a) the treatment of water resources; (b) the types of chemicals; (c) the 
characteristics of waste; (d) the types of waste guaranteed; (e) and how should 
waste is treated. In these aspects, the EU is still conducting its own counter study 
(DGEN 2012).  
 
With the events at Fukushima and the seemingly inevitable closure of the 
German nuclear power plants, shale gas could potentially foster a geopolitical 
earthquake in the European energy landscape (Ridley 2011). Currently, small 
bouts of controversial events—such as the announcement of the French 
parliament to ban ‘fracking’ and the numerous debates in other countries 
regarding potential shale gas deposits—are shaking the foundations of energy in 
Europe. Furthermore, international civil society and renewable companies 
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continue to be enemies of shale gas (Jezierski 2011). The local branches of 
American civil society such as the Habitat for Humanity, Sierra Foundation, and 
Green Peace continue to protest, disseminate, and argue the destructive potential 
of shale gas (DGEN 2012). Moreover, the capacity of shale gas to pollute water 
resources, which is a key ecological niche, is incomparable to all others. The main 
argument that seems to emanate from these groups is the structural difference of 
the United States and the European Union. For renewable energy companies, 
their fears come from the resulting loss of support for their energy sources, 
should shale gas be legitimised. In this context, the alliance of renewable energy 
and DG of Climate is very telling, and scary in the point of view of transnational 
companies (Shaw; Watt 2012 ).  
 
4.2 Summary 
 
I argue that unconventional energy modifies Estonia and Poland’s expectations of 
globalisation by opening new economic and political spaces. The main difference 
between oil shale and shale gas is the viability of the latter’s development in the 
near future. Estonia, the leader of oil shale development in the world, is the main 
developer of its internationalisation. Conversely, Poland is the receiver of 
knowledge and technology from other countries and companies (Poprawa. 
Although oil shale is much more polluting, Estonia, just like Poland, is trying to 
involve actors from across the world as a weapon to minimise the EU’s criticism 
of shale extraction (EPM 2012). In the coming years, Estonia and Poland plan to 
improve their administrative structures to improve coordination amongst the 
energy, environmental, economy, and all other departments (Kopczyńska 2012). 
 
There are two ideas that can be drawn from this. First, in both states and 
initiatives, the pressure and influence of the EU appear to be limited as several 
state-led initiatives to harness the global opportunities of unconventional energy 
are taking place. In the minds of Estonian and Polish policy makers, their fear 
emanates from several EU sources that endanger the unconventional energy. The 
competitive agendas and bureaucratic structure of the EU DGs, in the form of DG 
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Climate and DG Environment, threatens the viability of oil shale and the 
development of shale gas (EPM, PPM 2012). Although energy officials of Estonia 
and Poland have often found allies in the DG Energy and Industry, the potential 
impact of the other DGs often create fear in the minds of the member states (PPM 
2012). The entire landscape of the EU, highly vulnerable to lobbying interest, also 
threatens unconventional energy (EPM, PPM 2012;). In this sense, community 
competence is discouraged and the state returns as the primary actor. Second, 
and perhaps more importantly, both states are trying to prove the political and 
environmental credentials of unconventional energy. Estonia has been 
developing oil shale technology that minimises carbon emissions, while Poland 
continues to push for the relative absence of carbon emissions in shale gas 
(Jarno, & Warzecha 2011). From a realist standpoint, this is an attempt to limit 
outsider intervention and protect the legitimacy of shale energy, but it is quite 
intriguing that relations with resources are clearly seen. On the final note, is 
euroscepticism, or the fear or doubt on the European project, a cause of the rise 
in unconventional energy? Coming from the data in the interviews, it does not 
seem to be a factor at all, as it seems to be understood in the policy making circle 
that energy is highly protected, ‘intergovernmental’ sector (Kisel; Jaks 2012). 
However, while there is no resulting negative impact on the EU as a whole, or on 
other policy projects, the support on unconventional energy seem to be strong in 
both cases. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
This research was intended to help reveal the extent of the EU and globalisation’s 
influence on the public utilities of CEE, even after the accession process. To do 
this, the research focused on the creation of independent energy regulation, the 
growth of privatisation, and the improvement of competition in 
telecommunications and energy. Process tracing these changes in Estonia and 
Poland using the stepwise comparative method, I argued that the link between 
the EU level regulatory regime and policy transformations in public utilities is 
weak. Instead, I forward that Estonia and Poland are able to internalise 
globalisation by managing and harnessing its economic and political 
opportunities. I demonstrated this argument on two levels. In the first test, the 
type of capitalism and state size are organising logics of policy transformation, 
which largely influence the extent and form of market and governance shifts. By 
tracing these shifts in Estonia and Poland, I showed that the EU’s role in pushing 
for independent regulation, privatisation, and competition in electricity and 
telecommunications—while aided by the pressure of membership before 
accession—was hinged on its consistency and coherence with national, sectoral, 
and globalisation dynamics.  
 
In telecommunications, the effectiveness of policy transformation could be traced 
back to sectoral opportunities to acquire capital—such as global competitiveness, 
state size for Estonia, and the pressures for liberalisation during the financial 
deficits of Poland after 2004. In Estonia, the energy sector remained protected 
under state control because of the security and the ‘inward’ oriented ownership it 
exudes. Polish coal, while still mostly held by the government, has been gradually 
privatised since the end of the 90s. Oligopolistic structures remain in Poland, but 
privatisation became stronger after 2004, showing that the link of membership 
and policy transformation in markets is weak.  While privatisation seems to 
continue, competition appears to be limited by these oligopolistic trends that 
come from privatisation. For governance, independent regulation in Estonian 
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telecommunications appears to be effective due to the state’s decision to limit 
intervention in the sector. In Poland, governance seems to be a problem in both 
energy and telecommunications; specifically, since regulatory battles between the 
competition body and the sector-specific bodies continue, in which the EU seems 
to be strongly involved. Estonian energy regulation, conversely, remains under 
consistent state control because of security reasons; while in cases of regulatory 
conflict, the Estonian Supreme Court plays a strong role, affirming the 
sovereignty of the state in these matters. In both states, although weaker in 
Estonian energy, the EU’s influence in pushing for independent regulation seems 
strong even after accession. While the dissertation does not deal with these 
directly, several ideas could be possible explanations.  The embedding of 
regulatory norms among independent regulators could be taking place; 
simultaneously or alternatively, the EU’s regulatory regime—a seemingly 
intricate web of directives—allows the Commission and its DGs to intervene in 
regulatory matters. Since privatisation and competition are closely connected 
global trends, the EU’s impact in markets appears to be weaker. Measuring the 
EU’s significance via the four standards of markets, governance, decreasing 
oligopolistic structures, and internationalisation, the EU’s role is clear in the 
facilitation of the market and governance shifts, or setting the agenda for policy 
transformation. Nonetheless, compliance and marketization take place through 
the state and its ability to harness globalisation’s generative pressures. Even if the 
EU’s impact on governance seems stronger, it would be hard to conclusively say 
that the EU is the most important factor in the transformation of governance. 
Further studies in other CEE states are needed to untangle these relations.  
 
Therefore, the theoretical and empirical contribution comes from tracing the 
weak link between Europeanisation and policy transformation in the public 
utilities of two different new member states. Concept-wise, I untangled the 
impact of globalisation and Europeanisation by tracing the influence of one over 
the other. Instead of assuming that change comes from an EU-level regime, the 
dissertation argued that the intersection of globalisation, state capitalism, and 
state size are important organising logics in explaining the extent of policy 
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transformation and institutional form. Furthermore, while previous studies focus 
on ‘Western European countries’--Spain Portugal, Germany, France, Norway, 
and Switzerland--the study extends the empirical assessment to post-communist 
states, thereby testing the significance of membership. By demonstrating this 
argument both pre- and post-accession, the study interrogates the dominant 
theoretical point that the EU’s influence was most salient before the accession 
period. In analysing the varieties of capitalism within post-communist states, the 
dissertation demonstrated that although Estonia remains more neoliberal in 
most respects, Poland’s market-oriented approach in the energy sector allowed 
greater participation of market forces. This implication is a stark contrast to the 
post-communist varieties of capitalism literature, which calls for further study of 
varieties of capitalism in public utilities. Similarly, literature on state size often 
focus on either the state’s role in international relations or the state’s adjustment 
to economic policies, but often neglect the geographic configurations associated 
with the infrastructure of public utilities. 
 
Second—also related to the EU’s influence, different types of capitalisms, and 
state size—I argued that unconventional energy influences the state’s 
expectations of globalisation by opening new political and economic spaces. At 
this point, some member states and the DG of environment are wary of shale gas 
and oil shale, as well as the generative conflicting interests coming about. 
However, without the direct demands of membership nor the stronger regulatory 
provisions—specifically regarding energy mix—in the emerging EU energy policy, 
Estonia and Poland started using member-state initiatives to fortify their 
positions in the energy sector via internationalisation, or the inclusion of other 
actors in the process apart from the EU. This affirms the significance of some 
aspects often brushed upon by political scientists such as resource, technological, 
and expertise factors. The existence of a community of experts and practitioners 
of unconventional energy allowed the growth of shale resources to develop, 
decentralise, and to consolidate in both states. Although my research treats the 
chapter on unconventional energy as an initial piece, calling for further research 
in the area for other researchers, the initial work done on the on-going process of 
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unconventional energy politics shows that resources modify the opportunities 
and expectations of the state. This, consistent with resource geography’s main 
point that resources have social relations, demonstrates that shale resources 
modify Poland and Estonia’s strategies to consolidate the state—whether in 
security, international prestige, or economic opportunities—underneath the 
broad phenomenon of globalisation. Thus, the ‘presence’ of globalisation offers 
the undeniable opportunity to develop and harness unconventional energy 
beyond the limitations ‘imposed’ by the EU. However, since both are member 
states and since energy is interwoven with global issues, such as climate change, 
unconventional energy opens up a muddled topic and becomes a venue of 
multiple, contesting actors inside and outside the EU; this is further complicated 
by the web of EU governance. Due to its simultaneous intergovernmental and 
supranational nature, the politicised and inconsistent nature of the EU’s policies 
in these two unconventional energy resources is contributing to the 
internationalisation and a sort of post-communist, administrative defensiveness. 
As such, this logic might demonstrate the need to explore the dynamics of how 
different societies deal with resources; how humankind labels something as 
‘valuable’ or ‘useful’; and how further research can explore the mechanisms for 
the acceptance or rejection of certain resources, specifically in different kinds of 
governing regimes. 
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